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Economic development incentives (EDI) have been widely used by state and 
local governments over the past three decades. They are viewed as an important tool to 
attract business investment, create jobs and ultimately stimulate economic growth. 
Despite extensive research on this topic, however, no consensus has been reached 
regarding the efficacy of such policies. This dissertation evaluates existing literature, 
explores a new database, and provides empirical contributions to research on EDI. 
Findings of this research are of direct interest to policymakers. 
 Chapter 1 surveys the empirical literature on EDI and discusses major EDI data 
sources. It summarizes EDI use at the state level based on the Subsidy Tracker database, 
which is subsequently used for the empirical research throughout the rest of this 
dissertation. Some highlights of the database include the following. Overall, there has 
been a proliferation of EDI use in all regions in the US, but states differ greatly in EDI 
utilization. Generally, the number of programs is a poor representation of states’ EDI 
efforts. Aggregately, the South Region outspends the rest of the US even though the 
Midwest Region offers the most programs. Among different types of EDI, tax 
credits/rebates dominate, followed by grants/low cost loans.  
Chapter 2 investigates whether EDI spending crowds out public expenditures in 
U.S. states. The possible under-provision of public goods as a downside of incentive use 
has long been noted as a major concern in both academic and media outlets. Empirical 
evidence addressing this issue, however, has been scanty. Exploiting the Subsidy 
Tracker database, this chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
I use state-level panel data that allows for more generalizable analysis compared with 
x 
case studies focusing on one program in a single geographic location. Second, this 
chapter investigates the effect of incentives on public goods provision at the state level 
instead of local level (county or city). Previous literature emphasizes that incentives 
may have different effects at the state level versus local level (Peters and Fisher, 2004), 
but empirical work primarily focuses on the local level. Third, the Generalized Method 
of Moments approach is employed to account for dynamic features associated with 
public expenditures. Potential endogeneity of policy variables and problems with 
unbalanced panels are also addressed. The specification uses lags of EDI values to 
accommodate possible delayed responses. Results show relatively little effect of EDI on 
most public goods expenditures in the first two time periods (including the current year) 
with negative repercussions beginning to appear in year two and provide some evidence 
of crowding out of productive public goods. Considering the important role productive 
public goods play in the state’s long term growth, my results should serve as a warning 
to policymakers who contemplate using EDI programs to stimulate the economy. 
Chapter 3 employs spatial econometric techniques to estimate the extent of 
strategic interaction in states’ EDI spending decisions. Using a national search engine 
for EDI utilization, it is the first to examine strategic interaction in incentives use at the 
state level. It extends existing literature by exploiting panel data across states and by 
allowing for different definitions of neighbors to explore different EDI competition 
patterns across states. Results from 22 states during the period 2000 to 2011 indicate the 
presence of strategic interaction: states increase their EDI spending when their 
neighbors do so. The estimates range from 37 cents to 81 cents increases in EDI 
spending per dollar increase in neighbor’s EDI spending and are robust to numerous 
xi 
checks. Further, interstate competition in EDI spending does not seem to get more 
intense after the 2008 financial crisis, nor does it seem to be affected by state governor 
election cycles. 
Chapter 4 provides a preliminary examination of the relationship between EDI 
spending and state level income inequality. Results from dynamic panel methods 
indicate that EDI use is positively associated with the income share of top percentile. 
This poses a caveat to policymakers as EDI use could be linked to widening income 
inequality which could offset other possible benefits associated with EDI programs. 
Extensions for future research are discussed at the end of the chapter. 
  
1 
Chapter 1: Overview of Economic Development Incentives (EDI): 
Literature and Data 
1.1 EDI Literature 
Politicians are constantly pressured to stimulate local economic growth through 
the use of economic development incentives (EDI). The popularity of EDI can be 
attributable in part to its perceived benefits: higher business investment, job creation 
and economic growth. Despite decades of research on EDI, the efficacy of such policies 
is not well established in the literature.  
Case studies abound in EDI literature. Despite being informative and in depth, 
one big disadvantage about case studies is the lack of generalizability. The results 
typically lack external validity due to idiosyncrasies of the program or location. Table 
1.1 provides a summary of major case studies. 
In addition to case studies, there is also literature on specific types of EDI 
programs, such as Tax Increment Financing (TIF) and enterprise zone (EZ) programs. 
Felix and Hines (2013) examine the characteristics associated with U.S. communities 
that offer tax-based business development incentives. In particular, they investigate 
what types of communities are more likely to use TIF, while Man (1999) and Byrne 
(2005) allow for policy interaction in modelling communities’ decision to adopt TIF. 
Focusing on Chicago metropolitan area, Dye and Merriman (2000) find that 
municipalities adopting TIF grow more slowly compared with those that do not. Ladd 
(1994) discusses EZ programs including a review of case studies with the conclusion 
that enterprise zones are not a cost-effective way to stimulate employment. Bondonion 
and Greenbaum (2007) employ establishment level data across states to explore the 
2 
growth impacts of EZ policy. Their results indicate that the positive impacts of EZ 
policies are counteracted by losses incurred. 
Existing empirical studies mainly focus on evaluating employment, earning, and 
growth effects of EDI (Peters and Fisher, 2004; Patrick, 2012). The efficacy of EDI is 
less well represented in the literature. Two recent papers are Greenstone and Moretti 
(2003) and Patrick (2012). The former analyzes the effects of winning large industrial 
plants on local economies and fails to find decreases on important public goods 
expenditures by using data at the county level. Using matching strategy to study the 
fiscal effects of million dollar plants on county budgets, Patrick (2012) finds evidence 
of more spending on services by winning counties. The increase in debt, however, 
indicates service improvements are funded by borrowing and, hence, there is no 
evidence of fiscal surplus. Please refer to Table 1.2 regarding key empirical studies on 
EDI in the US.  
As impressive as these two studies are, it is important to examine state level tax 
incentives because they account for the majority of tax incentives since the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (Luger and Bae, 2005). Further, fiscal impacts of incentives at the state 
level are likely to be different from that at the local level. Incentives are more likely to 
be marginally effective among geographically adjacent areas because tax differences are 
more important when other costs are similar. Empirical studies agree to this point 
(Peters and Fisher, 2004).  
This dissertation focuses on investigating the effects of EDI at the state level. 
Chapter 2 sets out to examine the effects of EDI on public goods provision in U.S., 
which is motivated by the criticism against EDI use due to possible “crowding out” 
3 
effects on productive public goods (Rolnick and Burstein, 1995; Gorin, 2008). Chapter 
3 extends previous work by evaluating strategic interaction as a factor in explaining 
state level EDI spending. Chapter 4 explores the relationship between EDI use and 
income inequality using U.S. data. The rest of the introductory chapter describes 
existing data sources for EDI research and provides graphical presentation of the 
Subsidy Tracker database, which is employed in the empirical studies from Chapter 2 
through Chapter 4. 
1.2 EDI Data Sources 
1.2.1 Definition of Economic Development Incentives 
Hellerstein and Coenen (1995) consider tax incentives as “any provision 
designed to encourage new or expanded business activity in the state that is not an 
inherent part of the tax structure.
1
” Buss (2001) adopts the same definition and further 
points out that “the entire class of direct and indirect government subsidies includes but 
is not limited to property tax abatements, tax exemptions, low interest loans, free real 
estate, firm specific infrastructure, and firm specific job training.” Chi and Hofmann 
(2000) define business incentives as “public subsidies, including, but not limited to, tax 
abatement and financial assistance programs, designed to create, retain or lure 
businesses for job creation.” They consider both tax incentives (any credits or 
abatements) and financial incentives (loans, grants, infrastructure development or job 
training assistance), which is in line with the work of Buss (2001). Bartik (2005) 
focuses on cash or near cash assistance incentives versus customized services. This 
                                                          
1
 General tax policies in a state, such as corporate income tax rates, personal income tax rates and general 
sales tax rates, are not considered as part of EDI. 
4 
dissertation adopts the broader definition of EDI. Following Fisher and Peters (2004), 
my research considers both tax and non-tax incentives. 
2
 
1.2.2 EDI Measures and Data Sources 
It is well established in the literature that ideal measures for EDI are hard to 
obtain (Fisher and Peters, 1997; Patrick, 2012). Many of the earlier studies during the 
1980s and 1990s are built on problematic data or use measures which inadequately 
reflect the activeness or intensity of EDI use. The number of programs on a state’s 
books, for example, was used in a couple of studies as an estimate for the state’s 
incentives effort. Very often, however, this measure misrepresents a state’s or city’s 
commitment to economic development and masks the generosity of the incentives 
provided. It is not uncommon for states to have inactive or unfunded programs on their 
books. Additionally, states may combine or divide programs without changing the 
generosity of incentives offered. Fisher and Peters (1997) points out that the number of 
programs offered by one state is close to useless as a summary measure of one state’s or 
incentives effort. 
State economic development agency spending is another commonly used 
measure in the research. The budget of a state’s lead development agency, however, 
rarely manages to accurately indicate subsidies awarded to business. For one, 
development agency funds can be used for alternative purposes or non-economic 
activities. For another, incentives expenditures could come from sources other than the 
agency’s budget even when an appropriation is necessary. Hence, state economic 
development agency spending is a poor and problematic indicator for state economic 
                                                          
2
 Fisher and Peters (2004) emphasize “the firm, not the employee or job seeker, is the initial recipient of 
the incentive.” 
5 
development efforts (Gorin, 2008). Conclusions based on a measure such as this are 
suspectful. Notably, the data source for state economic development agency 
expenditures, i.e. the website for the National Association of State Development 
Agencies (NASDA), does not exist anymore. 
More recent studies adopt better measures but generally restrict their attention to 
a particular program, certain geographical locations, or incentives to large plants 
opening. For the purpose of this dissertation which focuses on EDI use across states, it 
is not enough to consider EDI use at a particular location or to big plants only. 
Fortunately, Good Jobs First (GJF) provides Subsidy Tracker, the first national search 
engine on EDI.
3
 This rich database draws from a variety of information sources and 
contains subsidy types, subsidy values, recipient company, awarding agency, state and 
year data. It includes 12 broad categories of both tax and non-tax incentive programs 
(tax credits/rebates, property tax abatements, megadeal, grants/low-cost loans, 
enterprise zones, tax increment financing, training reimbursements, cost 
reimbursements, infrastructure assistance, industrial revenue bonds, tax credits/rebates 
and grants, tax credits/rebates and property tax abatements).
4
 It is the most 
comprehensive database of incentives available. Two aspects of this database need to be 
acknowledged. First, it is a work in progress, so data are continually added. Second, for 
programs that extend over multiple years or even decades, the value of the whole 
                                                          
3
 Subsidy Tracker database: http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker. GJF is a non-partisan, 
nonprofit organization that promotes accountability in economic development and smart growth for 
working families.  
4
 For detailed description, please refer to Subsidy Tracker user guide: 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker-user-guide. 
6 
package was documented in the beginning year. In other words, the data are not 
allocated across time in the case of multi-year award amounts.
5
 
There are two other sources that provide EDI information. The New York Times 
assembles a database on business incentives from several sources including state 
government agencies, Investment Consulting Associates (ICA), Good Jobs First (GJF), 
company financial filings, and Equilar.
6
 For unidentified company recipients, they drew 
information from GJF and ICA. Available since December 1, 2012, it offers little 
additional information compared with GJF’s Subsidy Tracker. Further, this database has 




The Council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER) provides two 
databases related to EDI. The State Business Incentives is a directory of current 
incentive programs in each state: program name, program provider, program description 
and website link are provided. The directory does not provide amounts for each 
program nor does it contain historical information. The State Economic Development 
Program Expenditures Database includes budgetary information collected from state 
economic development agencies. It covers state expenses for economic development 
                                                          
5
 Harpel (2014) also has a detailed discussion about Subsidy Tracker. 
http://www.smartincentives.org/blogs/blog/14754093-good-jobs-first-and-subsidy-tracker-2-0. 
6
 ICA’s IncentivesMonitar database tracks major financial subsidies and incentives around the world. Its 
coverage starts from 2010 and is updated in real time. For more information, please go to 
http://www.icaincentives.com/. 
Equilar gathers data from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and facilitates data 
analysis for consulting firms, investors and corporate executives. Please refer to http://www.equilar.com/ 





purposes and beyond. 
8
The consistency of these expense categories facilitates 
comparison across states and over time. Unfortunately, it covers only more recent years, 
since fiscal year 2007. This database currently updates biannually and can be a 
promising source for future research on EDI. 
1.3 An Overview of EDI Use 
This discussion below provides a brief description of how EDI use evolved over 
time and presents some regional characteristics from Subsidy Tracker updated on July 




1.3.1 Incentives Use by States 
Table 1.3 illustrates the coverage of subsidy tracker data. It includes 48 U.S. 
states and D.C. during the years 1976-2013. Hawaii and Wyoming are excluded due to 
lack of EDI spending data. Check marks represent EDI spending data for a specific state 
in a given year are available, while blanks mean either no program was documented in 
that specific state-year, or no subsidy value was detailed. A glimpse at the table 
indicates a few states have a lot more observations than the rest. North Dakota, Virginia, 
New York and Kentucky have more than 20 years of EDI spending data, while DC and 
Massachusetts have only three. In addition to differences in reporting and disclosure, 
the variation in coverage probably also indicates that states differ in their efforts in EDI 
use. The following Table 1.4 just summarizes the information from Table 1.3. 
                                                          
8
 Please refer to C2ER website for more information 
(https://www.c2er.org/products/stateexpenditures.asp). 
9
 Given that Subsidy Tracker is frequently updated, it is important to note the publication data. 
8 
Chart 1.1 portrays counts of subsidy programs versus per capita EDI spending in 
an attempt to see how well program counts reflect subsidy intensity.
10
 When ranking 
states by the number of programs offered over sample period, we noticed great variation 
in EDI spending per capita even among states that offer few programs. EDI spending 
per capita goes from as little as less than 10 dollars in New Hampshire to as high as 
over 1000 dollars in Alaska and New Mexico. States that offer more programs like 
Wisconsin and Texas, however, do not necessarily outspend low program number states. 
A similar story appears in Chart 1.2 that shows number of programs against total EDI 
spending. The gist is that number of programs is a poor indicator of how active states 
are in their EDI spending. 
The following two charts (1.3 and 1.4) display per capita EDI spending and total 
EDI spending by state, averaged over available years. There are dramatic changes in 
EDI spending across states. On a per capita basis, there are very active states like 
Alaska and Louisiana that spend more than 100 dollars per capita. Meanwhile, low 
spending states include Colorado, New Hampshire and Maryland. This great variation 
among states is also prevalent for total EDI spending as shown in Chart 1.5. In this case, 
New York, Michigan and Washington stand out as states that spend a lot while North 
Dakota and Montana are the low spending states. 
The last three charts (1.5, 1.6 and 1.7) show how the counts of EDI programs 
and EDI spending (both in terms of per capita and total) have changed over time. In 
general, recent years has seen an increase in the number of programs offered by states 
before a notable dip in 2011. Per capita EDI spending has shown more of pro-business 
                                                          
10
 Per capita EDI spending is calculated as the summation of per capita EDI spending in each state over 
available years. 
9 
cyclical pattern, we see higher incentive spending during high growth years and low 
incentives spending associated during downturns like the early 1990s, mid 1990s and 
early 2000s. Total EDI spending has increased in general over time. 
1.3.2 Regional Variation in EDI Use by Type 
As demonstrated in the previous section, EDI use is prolific among U.S. states 
and states exhibit great variation in EDI use. This section breaks down EDI use by types 
and region to identify any pattern. Please refer to Table 1.5 regarding the classification 
of regions and division for U.S. states. 
Figure 1.1 ranks the number of EDI programs offered from all states over all the 
available years from smallest to largest by type. Tax credit/rebate programs dominate 
the number of programs provided, followed by grant/low cost loans. These two types 
programs for 60% of all programs offered. Less commonly used types include 
infrastructure assistance, tax credit/rebate combined with grants, cash grants and 
industrial revenue bonds. From the pie chart, we can see that Megadeal, training 
reimbursement and property tax abatement constitutes 30% of all programs offered, 
while enterprise zones, tax increment financing and the other less commonly used EDI 
types only add up to 10%.  
As mentioned before, program counts may not be a reliable measure for 
intensiveness of use. Hence, looking at the importance of each EDI type in terms of 
spending in real dollar values is more informative (Figure 1.2). Not surprisingly, 
Megadeals dominate other types (57%) because by definition Megadeal refers to 
packages 75 million dollars or more. In addition to Megadeals, tax credit/rebate and 
grants/low-cost loans account for a quarter of all programs in terms of EDI value. 
10 
Similar as before, infrastructure assistance, industrial revenue bonds, cash grants and 
cost reimbursements account for a very small proportion of total EDI spending over the 
years. The same patterns in data remain even if we take out programs classified as 
Megadeal. 
When we break down EDI programs offered by four regions (Figure 1.3), the 
Midwest Region and South Region accounts for about a third of all programs offered 
respectively, and West Region offers about the same number of programs as Northeast 
Region. In terms of total spending (Figure 1.4), however, we see a different picture. The 
South Region outspends all the other regions, reaching over 20 billion dollars over the 
years and accounting for about a third of all EDI spending. The Midwest Region and 
Northeast Region each account for about a quarter of total EDI spending, whereas West 
Region occupies the smallest proportion. 
Considering EDI patterns at the division level (Figure 1.5), there is variation 
within each region as well. Even though the Midwest Region offers the largest number 
of programs, the East North Central Division within it provides 50% more than the 
West North Central Division. The South Atlantic Division offers the most within South 
Region. The Mountain Division within West Region offers the fewest programs of all. 
In terms of real EDI spending (Figure 1.6), however, the Middle Atlanta Division 
outspends the rest, with about 14 billion dollars for a quarter of total spending. Next 
comes the East North Central Division, with about 17% of total spending. The New 
England Division and the Mountain division account for the smallest proportions, 3% 
and 5% respectively 
11 
1.4 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the empirical literature on EDI and 
summarizes major data sources available for research. In particular, it documents EDI 
use at the state level including time trends, states comparison, and regional variation 
using data from GJF. The Subsidy Tracker database informs the analyses from Chapter 
2 through Chapter 4. Some highlights of the database include the following.  
Every state has at least one type of incentive programs and EDI spending by 
state and local governments reach billions of dollars collectively. Recent years have 
seen an increase in EDI spending except 2013. Overall, EDI remains a popular tool 
among policymakers in US. 
The number of programs is a generally poor indicator of how active states are in 
their EDI use. In addition to Megadeals, tax credits/rebates dominate the use among 
different types of EDI, followed by grants/low cost loans and property tax abatements.  
EDI use varies greatly across states. Active states like Louisiana and Alaska 
spend more than 100 dollars per capita on average over the years whereas Colorado and 
New Hampshire spend less than a dollar per capita. In the aggregate, the Midwest 








Table 1.1: Summary of Major Case Studies on EDI 
 
 
Study Period Region/Focus Findings
Bartik and Erickcek (2012) 1995-2011
Michigan. Simulation of job and fiscal impacts 
of MEGA tax credit program
Greater fiscal and job creation benefits relative to 
cutting overall state business taxes
Weiner (2009) 2000s New England state. Four types of tax credits
New revenues do not offset initial costs, i.e., 
most credits do not "pay for themselves"
Calcagno and Hefner (2008) 2006-2007 South Carolina. Film industry
Subsidies to film industry are a net loss to state 
revenue
Wong and Stiles (2007) 1989-2007
Kansas and five surrounding states. Multiple 
Programs
States prefer to use tax incentives rather than 
direct subsidies to fund economic development.
Hoyt, Jepsen and Troske (2007) 1992-2004 Kentucky. Multiple Programs
Training incentives positively related to 
employment and earnings
Luger and Bae (2005) 1999 North Carolina. Simulation approach to study 
the effects of state business tax incentives
Not cost effective in inducing new employment
Goodman (2003) 1986-1999 Colorado. Sales tax Benefits largely transferred to relocated business 
and migrants rather than local residents
 
13 













Study Period Level Findings
Patrick (2012) 1977-1997 U.S. County
Winning counties spend more on services, 
but it is likely funded by borrowing than 
fiscal surplus
Greenstone and Moretti 
(2003)
1972-1992 U.S. County
No evidence of reduction in county 
government's budget and expenditures on 
important public services
O hUallachain and 
Satterthwaite (1992)
1977-1984 U.S. Metropolitan
Enterprise zones and university research 
parks are associated with increased job 
growth
de Bartolome and Spiegel 
(1997)
1990 U.S. State
State economic development expenditures 
positively correlated with manufacturing 
employment growth
Goss and Phillips (1997) 1986-1994 U.S. State
State economic development agency 
spending has a modest positive effect on 







Table 1.3: Subsidy Tracker Database (2013.07.09) 
 
 




1985 P P P 3
1986 P P 2
1987 P P P P 4
1988 P P P 3
1989 P P P P 4
1990 P P P 3
1991 P P P P P P P P 8
1992 P P P P P P P 7
1993 P P P P P P P P P 9
1994 P P P P P P P P P 9
1995 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 14
1996 P P P P P P P P P P P P P 13
1997 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 16
1998 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 17
1999 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 23
2000 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 24
2001 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 21
2002 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 27
2003 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 28
2004 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 27
2005 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 30
2006 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 30
2007 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 39
2008 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 43
2009 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 45
2010 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 44
2011 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 46
2012 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 42
2013 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 20
Total 10  12 4    13  12  13  20  3    16  19 13  16 13 25 11 9   28 6   3     17   7    15 16   13   8    8    12  23  6    7    18 12   12  27  18  7    15  7    6  6    5    11  17 7   22  15 9    6   6    604  
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State No. of Available Yrs State No. of Available Yrs
Alaska 10 Montana 8
Alabama 12 North Carolina 12
Arkansas 4 North Dakota 23
Arizona 13 Nebraska 6
California 12 New Hampshire 7
Colorado 13 New Jersey 18
Connecticut 20 New Mexico 12
DC 3 Nevada 12
Delaware 16 New York 27
Florida 19 Ohio 18
Georgia 13 Oklahoma 7
Iowa 16 Oregon 15
Idaho 13 Pennsylvania 7
Illinois 25 Rhode Island 6
Indiana 11 South Carolina 6
Kansas 9 South Dakota 5
Kentucky 28 Tennessee 11
Louisiana 6 Texas 17
Massachusetts 3 Utah 7
Maryland 17 Virginia 22
Maine 7 Vermont 15
Michigan 15 Washington 9
Minnesota 16 Wisconsin 6













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: U.S. States by Regions and Divisions11 
                                                          
11
 Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/econ/census07/www/geography/regions_and_divisions.html  
State Abbr. Region Division
Alabama AL South Region East South Central Division
Alaska AK West Region Pacific Division
Arizona AZ West Region Mountain Division
Arkansas AR South Region West South Central Division
California CA West Region Pacific Division
Colorado CO West Region Mountain Division
Connecticut CT Northeast Region New England Division
DC DC South Region South Atlantic Division
Delaware DE South Region South Atlantic Division
Florida FL South Region South Atlantic Division
Georgia GA South Region South Atlantic Division
Hawaii HI West Region Pacific Division
Idaho ID West Region Mountain Division
Illinois IL Midwest Region East North Central Division
Indiana IN Midwest Region East North Central Division
Iowa IA Midwest Region West North Central Division
Kansas KS Midwest Region West North Central Division
Kentucky KY South Region East South Central Division
Louisiana LA South Region West South Central Division
Maine ME Northeast Region New England Division
Maryland MD South Region South Atlantic Division
Massachusetts MA Northeast Region New England Division
Michigan MI Midwest Region East North Central Division
Minnesota MN Midwest Region West North Central Division
Mississippi MS South Region East South Central Division
Missouri MO Midwest Region West North Central Division
Montana MT West Region Mountain Division
Nebraska NE Midwest Region West North Central Division
Nevada NV West Region Mountain Division
New Hampshire NH Northeast Region New England Division
New Jersey NJ Northeast Region Middle Atltantic Division
New Mexico NM West Region Mountain Division
New York NY Northeast Region Middle Atltantic Division
North Carolina NC South Region South Atlantic Division
North Dakota ND Midwest Region West North Central Division
Ohio OH Midwest Region East North Central Division
Oklahoma OK South Region West South Central Division
Oregon OR West Region Pacific Division
Pennsylvania PA Northeast Region Middle Atltantic Division
Rhode Island RI Northeast Region New England Division
South Carolina SC South Region South Atlantic Division
South Dakota SD Midwest Region West North Central Division
Tennessee TN South Region East South Central Division
Texas TX South Region West South Central Division
Utah UT West Region Mountain Division
Vermont VT Northeast Region New England Division
Virginia VA South Region South Atlantic Division
Washington WA West Region Pacific Division
West Virginia WV South Region South Atlantic Division
Wisconsin WI Midwest Region East North Central Division
Wyoming WY West Region Mountain Division
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Chapter 2: Do Economic Development Incentives Crowd Out Public 
Expenditures in U.S. States? 
2.1 Introduction 
“Economic development incentives waste a lot of money on a microscopic fraction of 
employees and states should focus on investing in infrastructure and education that 
benefit everyone, rather than showering big companies with dollars.”— Greg LeRoy
12
 
Economic development incentives, including tax and nontax instrument, are 
prominent in the state and local fiscal landscape in the United States. According to the 
New York Times, state and local governments offer more than $80 billion in incentives 
each year. Recipients come from a variety of industries: oil and gas, technology, 
entertainment, financial services and retailers. More than $1 million worth of incentives 
has been award to some 5,000 companies. Notably, these incentive offers account for a 
substantial portion of the overall spending in many communities.  
The worry that economic development incentives may crowd out resources for 
productive public goods such as education and infrastructure is not new (Bartik, 1994; 
Rolnick and Burstein, 1995; Wilson, 1999; Gorin, 2008; Kenyon, Langley, and Paquin, 
2012). In 2011, states reduced public goods provision and increased taxes by an 
aggregate of $156 billion according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
Despite an extensive literature on economic development incentives, however, few 
studies focus on this aspect. Two notable exceptions are Greenstone and Moretti (2003) 
and Patrick (2012), both of which examine the effects on county finances following the 
                                                          
12
 Greg LeRoy, head of Good Jobs First, an economic development watchdog group, who was concerned 





opening of a large plant (“Million Dollar Plant”). This paper extends the literature by 
examining the effect of economic development incentives on the provision of public 
goods at the state level.  
This paper contributes to existing literature in a number of important ways. First, 
given the widespread use of economic development incentives, it is of paramount 
importance that policymakers have a better understanding of the costs of such policies. 
The opportunity costs in terms of forgone public goods and services have been 
demonstrated to be critical for a state’s economic growth (Helms, 1985; Mofidi and 
Stone, 1990; Fisher, 1997). Second, this study is aggregated at the state level. Previous 
literature has pointed out that the fiscal impacts of incentives at the state level are likely 
to be different from those at the local level (Peters and Fisher, 2004). Hence, it is 
important to examine state level tax incentives because they account for the biggest 
portion since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Luger and Bae, 2005). Third, by exploiting a 
new and exciting national database on incentives, I am able to explore the 
aforementioned question using panel data across U.S. states. My research, therefore, 
provides more generalizable results in contrast to previous literature which focuses on 
evaluating particular incentives or incentive programs in a single geographic area. 
This paper empirically examines the relationship between incentives use and 
public expenditures using panel data for U.S. states from 1984 to 2008. The Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM approach is used to account for dynamic features associated 
with public expenditures. I also use forward orthogonal deviation to transform the data 
for GMM estimation to mitigate the problem of magnified gaps in an unbalanced panel 
associated with traditional first-differenced GMM estimator. Additionally, the empirical 
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model includes lags of incentives to account for lagged effects of incentives 
expenditures.  
The GMM estimation results indicate little effect of economic development 
incentives on most public goods in the first two time periods (including the current 
year), with negative repercussions appearing in year two. A dollar increase in incentives 
spending is associated with a $0.186 decrease in overall public expenditures two years 
later. There is also evidence of decreases in expenditures on some categorized 
productive public goods. At the same time, however, incentives are associated with 
increases in higher education expenditures. Overall, results of this paper lend support to 
the concern that economic development incentives crowd out spending on public goods 
and services. Considering the critical role that productive public goods and services 
play in promoting state economic growth, these results serve as additional warning for 
policymakers who contemplate using economic development incentives to stimulate 
economic growth.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys previous literature. Section 3 
describes the state level panel data used for the estimation, while Section 4 presents the 
econometric models which will be used to investigate the effect of incentives 
expenditures. Section 5 presents an analysis of empirical results. Robustness checks are 
performed in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.  
2.2 Status of Literature 
There is extensive literature examining the efficacy of economic development 
incentives in attracting business investments, creating jobs and stimulating economic 
growth. However, no consensus has been reached regarding the effectiveness of such 
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policies (Patrick, 2014). Advocates of incentives see them as an effective means for 
growth and claim that incentives can “pay for themselves”. They argue that business 
decisions will be influenced by incentives, leading to job creation and growth 
(Greenstone and Moretti, 2003). As a result, revenues from new economic activities 
negate the offered incentives. They also argue that the costs of incentives will be 
effectively lower if job creation reduces state’s spending on welfare programs. Critics, 
however, believe that incentives are not effective at the margin, hence there is little 
growth induced, if any (Peters and Fisher, 2004). In addition, even if higher levels of 
economic activity are achieved, population growth may ensue. The additional strain on 
crowded public goods like infrastructure, education and other services are likely to 
prevent the expected growth from happening (Bartik, 1991). Taken as a whole, the 
literature is not very useful for policymakers in determining, under which circumstance, 
if any, to offer economic development incentives. 
The lack of consensus in existing literature is attributable to differences in data 
and methodologies. This can be seen most prominently in case studies (Bartik and 
Erickcek, 2012; Weiner, 2009; Calcagno and Hefner, 2009; Wong and Stiles, 2007; 
Hoyt, Jepsen and Troske, 2007; Luger and Bae, 2005; Goodman, 2003). The myriad of 
case studies, however, suffer from lack of generalizability. Such case studies do not 
inform the use of economic development incentives elsewhere due to idiosyncratic 
nature of programs, industries, and location specific factors.  
Existing state level studies generally find that incentives are positively 
correlated with state income and job growth (OhUallachain and Satterthwaite, 1992; De 
Bartolome and Spiegel, 1997; Goss and Phillips, 1997). However, results based on 
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indirect measures of incentives in earlier research may not be very meaningful (Fisher 
and Peters, 1997).  
More recent research exploits more detailed data and more advanced 
econometrics techniques. Greenstone and Moretti (2003) and Patrick (2012) are prime 
examples. The former examines the effect of winning a large plant on wages, property 
values, and public finances by using runner-up counties (i.e., the ‘losers’) as a 
counterfactual for winners. They do not find any reduction in public goods provision as 
a result of winning the bid. Patrick (2012) uses a matching strategy to identify the effect 
on employment, earnings as well as the fiscal impacts of a million dollar plant openings. 
She finds that winning counties appear to provide an increased level of public services 
to their growing populations, but that service improvements are funded by borrowing 
rather than the creation of a fiscal surplus. 
The previous literature largely neglects the issue of how economic development 
incentives affect the provision of public goods and services. To my best knowledge, no 
study has explored the question at the state level. This question is important in that if 
incentives are not effective in influencing business location decisions, then using them 
would detract from growth by reducing funds available for spending on productive 
public goods and services. 
Bartik (1991), Fisher (1997), and Wasylenko (1997) among others have 
reviewed how state and local fiscal policy in general affects growth.
13
 Using a budget 
constraint approach, Helms’ (1985) seminal paper establishes that economic growth is 
enhanced if increased revenue through higher taxes is used to fund public goods and 
                                                          
13
 Fisher (1997) concluded that at least “some public services clearly have a positive effect on some 
measures of economic development in some cases.” 
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services such as education, highways, and public health and safety; while economic 
growth is retarded if revenue is used to finance transfer payments. The explanation is 
that benefits from improved public goods and services outweigh the disincentive effects 
of the associated higher taxes. His findings underscore the importance of considering 
impacts of a state's expenditures as well as by its taxes. Following Helms (1985), 
Mofidi and Stone (1990) reach similar findings regarding the effect on investment and 
manufacturing employment. They suggest that there are tradeoffs in state and local tax 
and expenditure policies and point out that raising transfer payment at cost of less 
public investments in education, health, highways and other public infrastructure has 
adverse consequences. 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Measures of Economic Development Incentives 
Existing literature establishes that ideal measures for EDI do not exist (Fisher 
and Peters, 1997; Patrick, 2014). Many earlier studies use problematic data or use 
measures that inadequately reflect how active governments were in offering incentives. 
Simple counts of incentives programs, for example, can be severely misleading and are 
a poor measure of a state’s economic development efforts. Programs on a state’s book 
may be outdated and states may combine or divide programs without changing the 
generosity of incentives offered (Fisher and Peters, 1997). A state’s economic 
development agency spending is also flawed because development agency funds can be 
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used for noneconomic activities and EDI spending may not come from alternative 
sources.
14
 Conclusions based on a measure like this are suspectful.  
This paper exploits the Subsidy Tracker, gathered by the non-profit, non-
partisan group Good Jobs First, as discussed in the literature (Jansa and Gray, 2014).
15
 
This database brings together public records of incentives granted to businesses under a 
wide variety of state programs and is publicly available online. It includes the actual 
dollar value of incentives granted, providing a measure of state economic development 
incentives spending that was previously elusive. 
Subsidy Tracker is the first national search engine for EDI. It includes 12 broad 
categories of both tax and non-tax incentive programs (tax credits/rebates, property tax 
abatements, megadeal, grants/low-cost loans, enterprise zones, tax increment financing, 
training reimbursements, cost reimbursements, infrastructure assistance, industrial 
revenue bonds, tax credits/rebates and grants, tax credits/rebates and property tax 
abatements).
16
 Despite extensive efforts to collect data, this database is unlikely to be 
inclusive of all incentive programs and the granted values, as discussed in the literature 




                                                          
14
 Gorin (2008) provides an excellent example from Oklahoma. Notably, the data source for state 
economic development agency expenditure, i.e. the website for the National Association of State 
Development Agencies (NASDA), does not exist anymore. 
15
 Subsidy Tracker database: http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker. For detailed description of 
incentives types included, please refer to Subsidy Tracker user guide: 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker-user-guide. 
16
 Most incentive programs, however, are concentrated in two categories: tax credits/rebates and 
grants/low-cost loans. Hence, it is not feasible to estimate the model for each category of incentives. 
17




Each Subsidy Tracker database entry represents a subsidy granted to an 
individual firm within a specific state.
18
 Due to limited data availability of government 
finance data, only entries up to 2008 are included. Subsidy values are aggregated by 
state-year. 
2.3.2 Other Variables 
Following Case, Hines and Rosen (1993), the dependent variables are the sum of 
state and local government expenditures in different categories.
19
 The model is 
estimated using US data from 1984 to 2008. State and local government finance data 
were provided by the Census. All dollar values are expressed in terms of per capita and 
converted to real values (using 1982—1984 as the base year). Population density, the 
proportion of population under age 15, and the proportion of population above age 65 
are from US Census. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides data on personal 
income as well as Consumer Price Index (CPI). Financial data was matched with 
demographic information. In addition to overall public expenditures, this study focuses 
on spending on different categories of public goods and services including 
administration, corrections, education, health and human services, highways, police and 
fire protection, sanitation and utilities.
20
 
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics. The dataset contains 378 observations. 
The descriptive statistics indicate considerable variation in expenditures on economic 
development incentives and spending on different categories of public goods and 
services across states. A closer examination of my sample reveals that Alaska in 1990 
                                                          
18
 I downloaded the version updated on Sept.10, 2013. Entries were aggregated by state-year. 
19
 Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) argue that state government expenditures are more likely to reflect 
variation in the cross section assignment of spending responsibilities between state and local governments. 
20
 Following Case, Hines and Rosen (1993), expenditures on health and human services are the sum of 
health and hospital spending and public welfare expenditures. 
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spent the most on incentives, about $653 per capita; while Virginia in 1991 spent the 
least on incentives, about $0.01 per capita. Of the average annual total state and local 
expenditures of $3,748.86 per capita, about 20 percent is spent on elementary education 
($759.32), 20 percent on health and human services ($774.55), 7 percent on highways 
($246.78), 6 percent on utilities ($209.82), and 4 percent on police and fire protection 
($157.37).  
Following Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) and Redoano (2007) among others, 
expenditures in various categories of public goods are regressed on a set of control 
variables, which will be discussed in detail in Section 4. In addition, up to three lags of 
incentives expenditures have also been added on the right hand sided to take into 
account of possible delayed effect, which restricts the sample to 27 or 28 states. 
2.4 Regression Model 
2.4.1 Baseline Model 
Following the spirit of Case, Hines and Rosen (1993), the baseline model with 
all variables in levels is specified as follows: 
(1)  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑖𝑡  𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡  𝛿 𝑖 + µ𝑡𝜈 𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is a category of public expenditures for state 𝑖  in year 𝑡 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡  is incentives 
expenditures, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is own state characteristics. The conditioning variables ( 𝑥𝑖𝑡  ) 
include intergovernmental transfers (i.e. federal grant or federal intergovernmental 
revenue), state personal income, population density, and percentage of young and elder 
population. Grants and income measure resources available to state and local 
governments, while population density captures economies or diseconomies of scale in 
public goods provision. Demographic characteristics are included to account for the 
demand for public goods from specific demographic groups. State and year fixed effects 
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are included to control for unobserved factors that do not change over time and macro 
shocks that affect all states in the same time period. 
2.4.2 Dynamic Panel – GMM Estimation 
Public expenditures, like many other economic variables, are dynamic in nature: 
spending decision are likely to follow historical patterns and are influenced by 
contemporaneous factors. Following Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and Redoano (2007), 
I include a one year lag of dependent variables in baseline model (1) in order to 
accommodate the sluggish adjustments in public expenditures over time. Expenditures 
on public goods and services for state 𝑖 in year 𝑡 are then modeled as follows: 
(2) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑖 + µ𝑡 +𝜈 𝑖𝑡, 
Introducing lagged dependent variables, however, brings estimation challenges 
as illustrated below. To address these concerns, I use the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). First, the GMM 
estimator gets rid of state fixed effects through differencing. Second, lagged 
endogenous variables in the level form and lagged exogenous variables in the 
differenced form serve as instruments. At last, specification tests are performed to check 
the validity of instruments. A problem with first differencing the model is that it 
magnifies gaps in data for an unbalanced panel. To mitigate the problem, I adopt 
forward orthogonal deviation to transform my data instead of using first differencing 
(Roodman, 2009). 
2.4.2.1 Estimation Concerns 
To see estimation challenges in a dynamic panel as laid out in (2), the model is 
written in a more generic form below: 
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+ µ𝑡 + 𝜈 𝑖𝑡for 𝑖 , …, 𝑡,…,T. 
We can easily tell that lagged dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is correlated with 𝛿 𝑖 in the error 
term. This endogeneity causes OLS estimator to be biased and inconsistent. Further, this 
problem cannot be circumvented with 2SLS or panel fixed effects estimator (Roodman, 
2009). The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) is a standard way to address these concerns (Roine et al, 2009).  
2.4.2.2 First-Differenced GMM: Arellano and Bond (1991) 
The GMM estimator starts with first differencing the model to remove state 
fixed effects. The transformed model is estimated using lagged levels of the dependent 
variable and endogenous variables, as well as differences of exogenous variables as 







+ ∆  
𝑖𝑡
,  






) + ∆µ𝑡 + ∆𝜈 𝑖𝑡, for i = 1, 2,…, N and t = 2,…,T , 




for t = 3,4,…,T and s > = 2. 




for t = 3,4,…,T and s > = 2. 
2.4.2.3 Forward Orthogonal Deviation Transformation – Adapted to an Unbalanced 
Panel 
First differencing, however, shrinks the data set and amplifies gaps in an 
unbalanced panel. If 𝑦 
𝑖𝑡
 
is missing, for example, then both ∆ 𝑦 
𝑖𝑡




missing in the first differenced transformed data. Alternative transformations, forward 
orthogonal deviations or orthogonal deviations, helps to mitigate the problem (Arellano 
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and Bover 1995). In contrast to the first differencing transformation, which deducts 
observation from last period from the present one, the forward orthogonal deviation 
transformation subtracts the average of all future values from the present one (Roodman, 
2009). Thus, the forward orthogonal deviation transformation only discards the last 
observation for each group, which minimizes data loss.
21
  
Further, lagged observations are valid instruments since they do not enter the 
formula. A recent simulation study by Hayakawa (2009) shows that the GMM estimator 
transformed by forward orthogonal deviation tends to work better than the one 
transformed by first differencing. Given that my panel is unbalanced with gaps, I adopt 
the forward orthogonal deviation transformation to preserve observations. 
22
  
2.4.2.4 Specification Tests for GMM Estimators: AR (1), AR (2) and Sargan Tests 
The consistency of the difference GMM estimator depends critically on the 
validity of the moment conditions listed in (5) – (6) and the lack of second order serial 
correlation in the error terms. The Sargan/Hansen test is used to examine the validity of 
instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous as a group. As a 
result, a higher p-value of the Sargan/Hansen statistic is preferred. 
The other important diagnostic is the AR test for autocorrelation of the residuals. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator relies on the lack of second order serial 
correlation. By construction, the residuals of the first differenced equation should 
possess serial correlation. Accordingly, the null is always rejected for the AR (1) test. 
For instruments to be valid, differenced residuals should not show significant second 
order of serial correlation. Accordingly, a high reported p-value in AR (2) test indicates 
                                                          
21
Further, Hayakawa (2009) shows in a recent simulation study that the GMM estimator transformed by 
forward orthogonal deviation tends to perform better than the one transformed by first differencing. 
22
 Please refer to Roodman (2009) for mathematical representation. 
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that the moment conditions are valid. If the AR (2) statistic is significant, longer lags 
need to be used. 
2.4.3 Capturing Lagged Effects of Incentives 
Lastly, I include lagged values of incentives expenditures to capture possible 
delayed effects of incentives to allow time for reactions to occur. Specifically, the 
dynamic panel model in (2) is modified as follows: 
(7) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡 𝛽3𝐼𝑖𝑡−𝑠 +  𝛽4𝑥𝑖𝑡  δ 𝑖 + µ𝑡 + 𝜈 𝑖𝑡 where s =1, 2, or 
3. 
2.5 Results 
Regression results of equation (7) are summarized in Table 2.2 with each 
column representing a specific category of public goods. OLS, FE and Difference 
GMM estimation methods have been performed. As discussed in the literature 
(Roodman, 2009), the lagged dependent variable was positively correlated with the 
error, which biases 𝛽1, the coefficient associated with 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1, upward for OLS estimation; 
whereas the estimate of 𝛽1 is biased downward due to the negative sign in front of the 
within group transformed error from the fixed effects regression. Therefore, a reliable 
estimate should lie in between the two values, which serves a useful check.
23
  
Coefficient estimates are generated using a one-step GMM.
24
 The second lag or 
more of endogenous variables (lagged public expenditures,  𝑦𝑖𝑡−1  ) are selected as 
instruments while all lags for exogenous variables (grants, personal income, incentives, 
population density and percentages of old as well as young population) serve as 
                                                          
23
 This condition is met with my results, but due to space limitation, Only GMM results are presented 
here. OLS and FE results are available upon request. 
24
 For applied work using the one-step GMM estimator, please refer to Arai, Kinnwall, and Thoursie 
(2004), Falk (2006), Huang, Hwang, and Yang (2008), and Yao (2006).etc. 
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instruments. Sargan test statistics are presented to examine the validity of the 
instruments. The reported AR (1), AR (2) and Sargan results support the validity of 
selected instruments in most cases.  
In general, the results indicate that incentives expenditures are not 
contemporaneously correlated with public expenditures at the state level. They are, 
however, negatively correlated with overall expenditures after two years, and the 
relationship is statistically significant at conventional levels. There is also evidence of 
decreases in expenditures on corrections, elementary education, health and human 
services, police and fire protection, sanitation and utilities associated with incentives 
expenditures. Spending on higher education, on the other hand, is found to be positively 
associated with incentives expenditures. It is worth noting that most of the decreases in 
spending do not occur until two years later, which seems to indicate that at least in the 
very short run incentives do not contribute to spending on public goods and services. 
The coefficients associated with incentives spending are not only statistically significant, 
but also have potentially huge economic effects.  
For the average state, one dollar increase in incentives is correlated with $0.186 
decrease in direct expenditures two years later. Given that the average state spends 20.2 
dollars per capita on incentives during sample period, this implies a 3.76 (20.2*0.186) 
dollars decrease in per capita direct expenditures, about 0.1% of direct expenditures two 
years later. As an example of New Mexico in 2004 which had the highest incentives 
expenditures, 557.74 dollars of incentives spending would be associated with 103.74 
dollars less in per capita spending two years later, accounting for about 2.5% of direct 
expenditures in 2006 (103.74/4105.73*100=2.5%). 
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Take health and human services as another example. A dollar increase in per 
capita incentives is associated with 16 cents decrease in per capita spending on health 
and human services two years later. Given that the average state spends 20.2 dollars per 
capita on incentives during the sample period, this implies a $3.23 (20.2*0.16) drop in 
per capita health and human services expenditures two years later, about 0.2% of 
average health and human spending (3.23/774.5*100=0.4%). For New Mexico in 2004, 
557.74 dollars of incentives is associated with 89.24 dollars less per capita spending 
two years later, which is about 10% of its spending on health and human services in 
2006 (89.24/893*100=10%). 
Regarding other control variables, grants are generally positively and 
significantly correlated with expenditures on different categories of public goods and 
services. The estimated coefficient on grants for direct expenditures in GMM estimation 
indicate that for a dollar increase in federal grants, states spend about half of it, the 
magnitude of which is in sharp contrast with that of state personal income. The 
phenomenon that state and local governments spend much more out of their grant 
income than personal income of their residents is called flypaper effect. My estimate of 
this “flypaper effect” is comparable to previous estimates, which range from as small as 
0.25 to around unity with most estimates around 0.5 (Hines and Thaler, 1995). 
Demographic characteristics can influence the composition of public spending 
to the extent that they determine the needs and preferences of population for public 
goods. The inclusion of population density provides information about scale economies 
and potential congestion effects in the provision of public goods. The estimated 
coefficients for population density are either insignificant or positive. The latter 
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indicates diseconomies of scale. My results are similar to those of Ermini and Santolini 
(2010) and Silva, Veiga, and Portela (2011). The proportion of population above 65 is 
mostly negatively associated with expenditures on public goods, consistent with 
previous studies (Case, Hines and Rosen, 1993; Redoano, 2007). The effect of the share 
of young population (under 15) varies with the category of public goods.  
Baseline GMM estimation indicates that the share of young population is 
negatively associated with expenditures on higher education, sanitation and highways, 
while positively associated with health and human services expenditures. This makes 
sense as higher education expenditures are devoted to population aged 17 years or 
above. Additionally, younger people generally live with their parents. Hence a greater 
percentage of young population implies fewer households, which reduces spending on 
sanitation and utilities. Similar reasoning applies to highways expenditures: a higher 
percentage of young people implies fewer drivers on the road, and consequently less 
need to maintain/expand highways. A larger proportion of young people, however, can 
be expected to increase expenditures on health and hospitals as well as public welfare. 





A number of robustness checks have been performed. First, to test potential 
impact of outliers, I limit my sample to the time period after 1990 when data coverage 
                                                          
25
 I also estimated alternative model to investigate if the changes in incentives expenditures have an 
impact on changes in expenditures on public goods. The first differenced model, however, essentially 
looks at contemporaneous effects of incentives on the provision of public goods. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that most results are insignificant considering it takes time for incentives to have an impact. 
 
46 
on incentives is more comprehensive. I then perform the same GMM estimation as 
before. Results are presented in Table 2.3. 
Coefficient estimates are qualitatively the same as in the previous estimation 
(Table 2.2). The coefficient on one year lag of public expenditure variables remains 
positive and significant at conventional levels. Total grants are positively associated 
with public expenditures when significant. Incentives coefficients estimates are 
qualitatively similar to that of baseline estimation but the magnitude becomes smaller 
for direct expenditures, which decreases from 0.186 to 0.146. Estimated coefficients on 
administration and highways expenditures remain insignificant. Regarding corrections 
estimates, incentives are only associated with decreases in expenditure three years later. 
The magnitude of the estimated impact on elementary education also becomes bigger, 
from 0.065 to 0.071. Incentives continue to be positively associated with expenditures 
on higher education but are of smaller magnitudes. Expenditures on police and fire, 
sanitation, utilities are still negatively associated with incentives expenditures; however, 
estimated coefficients are smaller. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar except 
that estimated coefficients on incentives are smaller using the limited sample.  
Additionally, the basic model is estimated through difference GMM (DGMM) 
where incentives are treated as endogenous. Because the extent to which states use 
incentives might depend on other unobservable factors which influence spending 
choices, the incentives variable 𝐼𝑖𝑡 may be correlated with error term. To deal with this 
potential endogeneity problem, I instrument 𝐼𝑖𝑡  with its lags. The results using 
instruments for 𝐼𝑖𝑡 are presented in Table 2.4. Compared with the results in Table 2.2, 
the estimated negative correlation between incentives and expenditures on public good 
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are strengthened in most cases: not only do the magnitudes become larger, the 
significant level also increases. The estimated coefficient on direct expenditures 
increases in magnitude to 0.193. For police and fire protection, health and human 
services, sanitation and utilities expenditures, estimated coefficients also become larger 
and the significance level increases to 5%. Overall, this suggests that the effects of 
incentives may be underestimated if potential endogeneity is ignored. Estimates on 
demographic variables are very similar to the baseline estimates except that the 
percentage of young population is also found to be negatively associated with 
administration spending: a one percentage increase in young population is associated 
with about 2.5 dollars decrease in per capita administration spending. 
A potential problem with difference GMM estimator is that lagged independent 
variables can be poor instruments when they do not change much over time. This does 
not seem to be a problem for my estimation. Nevertheless, a third robustness estimates 
the baseline model through dynamic system GMM, developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). It helps to address the aforementioned problem with difference GMM by 
providing more moment conditions available from the level equation. Following 
Blundell and Bond (1998) the level equation (2) is incorporated in the first-differenced 
GMM. Variables in the level equation are instrumented with their own differences. 
Table 2.5 reports system GMM regression results with the incentives 
expenditure variable treated as exogenous. The results are basically consistent with the 
baseline estimates in Table 2.3, where the incentives variable is treated the same way. 
The only major difference is that the estimated coefficient on direct expenditures is 
much larger, almost doubling from previous estimate, reaching -0.334. And one year lag 
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of incentives now is negatively associated with expenditures on highways. 
Demographic variables are similar to previous estimates. Table 2.6 presents the last 
robustness check, where I estimate the model using system GMM estimator with 
incentives being treated as endogenous. Again, the results are similar. 
2.7 Conclusion 
EDI are widely used by state and local governments as a tool to lure investment, 
create jobs and ultimately induce economic growth. Despite sizeable incentives offered, 
very few states are effective in evaluating the EDI programs offered (Pew Center 
Report, 2012). The prominence of business incentives in debates on public policy and 
economic development has led to extensive theoretical and empirical research. Most 
empirical research to date, however, has focused on evaluating the employment and 
investment/growth effects of a particular incentive program in a single geographic area.  
This paper takes a novel approach by investigating whether incentive spending 
crowds out spending on other public goods and services at the state level. With the 
benefit of a national database of economic development incentives, dynamic panel data 
analysis is implemented. Estimates using a GMM estimator controlling for the dynamic 
nature of state spending as well as possible lagged effects of incentives show that public 
expenditures are negatively associated with incentive use. In particular, the main 
findings indicate that incentives expenditures are associated with decreases in 
expenditures on productive public goods such as education, health and human services, 
sanitation and utilities. Empirical evidence shows that incentives do not seem to 
contribute to more spending on productive public goods and services after two years. 
This contradicts the claims that incentives lead to beneficial growth in the economy. Or 
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if growth occurs, it does not lead to expansion of spending on productive public goods 
and services.  
It is worth noting that Subsidy Tracker database has limitations; nonetheless, it 
is an improved measure for incentives compared with previous studies and it is the best 
data publicly available to data. In times of fiscal stress, it is of paramount importance to 
understand what states are giving up especially given the close link between public 
services and economic growth (Helms, 1985; Mofidi and Stone, 1990; Miller and 
Russek, 1997). My findings echo the long standing criticism against incentives 
spending (Rolnick and Burstein, 1995; Fisher and Peters, 2004). For policymakers who 
care about long term economic growth, the extensive use of incentives is questionable. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (# of observations=378) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subsidy Spending ($) 20.20 55.49 0.01 652.70 
Grants ($) 673.40 200.00 317.77 1,602.35 
 Income ($) 17,160.82 2,863.98 10,690.91 26,940.42 
Population 6,648,663 6,690,211 547,160 36,600,000 
Total State Area (sq.mi) 73,487.70 88,428.92 1,545.05 663,267.30 
Population Density (total) 179.13 213.27 0.82 998.83 
Under 15 (%) 20.77 1.60 17.02 28.03 
Above 65 (%) 12.64 1.91 3.84 18.55 
Expenditures: 
              Direct Expenditures ($) 3,748.86 863.06 1,933.09 8,505.26 
          Administration ($) 155.04 55.01 72.17 502.27 
          Corrections ($) 91.78 30.56 24.71 174.18 
          Elementary Education ($) 759.32 163.88 370.67 1,339.45 
          Higher Education ($) 316.20 84.80 155.79 550.21 
          Health & Human Services ($) 774.55 201.40 335.71 1,558.95 
          Highways ($) 246.78 87.96 123.21 859.57 
          Police & Fire ($) 157.37 46.05 64.11 278.78 
          Sanitation ($) 92.32 27.69 34.86 175.14 
          Utilities ($) 209.82 143.27 39.58 1,035.49 
 
Sources: Incentives data are from Subsidy Tracker database. Data on demographic characteristics are 
from Bureau of the Census. Personal Income data are drawn from Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the 
rest government finance data are from Census historical database. 
Notes:  
(1) All dollar figures have been converted to real values, deflated by CPI (1982-84=100). 
(2) All dollar values are on a per capita basis. 






Table 2.2: Baseline Difference GMM Results 
 
Direct_Exp Admin Corretions Elem Edu Higher Edu 
Health 
& Human Highways 
Police 
& Fire Sanitation Utilities 
Y(t-1) 0.833 0.921 0.690 0.822 0.800 0.822 0.438 0.770 0.671 0.325 
 
[0.094]*** [0.111]*** [0.059]*** [0.125]*** [0.073]*** [0.196]*** [0.135]*** [0.085]*** [0.105]*** [0.266] 
Grants 0.520 0.005 -0.004 0.055 -0.003 0.193 0.161 0.007 -0.004 -0.044 
 
[0.118]*** [0.019] [0.015] [0.051] [0.018] [0.072]** [0.055]*** [0.009] [0.014] [0.036] 
Income 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
 
[0.014] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.007] [0.005] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004]* 
I(t) -0.254 0.013 -0.076 0.009 0.047 -0.034 -0.059 -0.016 -0.003 -0.150 
 
[0.185] [0.009] [0.036]** [0.021] [0.022]** [0.099] [0.036] [0.008]** [0.020] [0.099] 
I(t-1) 0.053 0.017 -0.010 0.007 0.044 0.079 -0.016 -0.013 -0.013 -0.032 
 
[0.157] [0.020] [0.008] [0.038] [0.015]*** [0.088] [0.035] [0.009] [0.009] [0.034] 
I(t-2) -0.186 0.002 -0.022 -0.065 0.045 -0.160 0.036 -0.007 -0.029 -0.059 
 




      
0.012 
   
[0.009]*** 
      
[0.069] 
Pop_Density 2.872 0.281 0.020 0.711 -0.125 1.442 0.002 0.054  0.125   0.684 
 
[1.259]** [0.079]*** [0.077] [0.571] [0.136] [0.541]** [0.409] [0.068]  [0.106]  [0.448] 
Under 15 20.241 -2.087 -1.192 4.801 -3.043 11.586 -10.585 -0.044 -3.425 -5.722 
 
[13.598] [1.819] [1.852] [5.722] [1.562]** [6.432]* [6.616] [1.620] [1.152]*** [4.003] 
Above 65 -36.209 2.603 0.196 -3.365 5.447 7.947 -9.758 -4.129 2.746 8.957 
 
[21.057]* [2.384] [1.505] [9.024] [3.650] [16.940] [8.944] [2.903] [2.868] [8.706] 
AR(1) 0.001 0.011 0.038 0.026 0.015 0.037 0.041 0.002 0.006 0.037 
AR(2) 0.177 0.158 0.101 0.223 0.226 0.454 0.785 0.947 0.715 0.200 
Sargan Test 0.287 0.278 0.487 0.519 0.306 0.169 0.405 0.124 0.300 0.310 
 
Notes:  
(1) Column variables are categories of public expenditures for state and local government. 
(2) All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in brackets, robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 









Table 2.3: Difference GMM (Restricted Sample Period 1991-2008) 
 
 Direct_Exp Admin Corrections Elem Edu Higher Edu 
Health 
& Human Highways 
Police 
& Fire Sanitation Utilities 
Y(t-1) 0.920 0.921 0.630 0.879 0.830 0.810 0.470 0.869 0.535 0.088 
 
[0.094]*** [0.110]*** [0.069]*** [0.057]*** [0.056]*** [0.171]*** [0.129]*** [0.183]*** [0.131]*** [0.258] 
Grants 0.474 0.006 -0.006 0.056 -0.006 0.191 0.141 0.007 0.002 -0.043 
 
[0.123]*** [0.016] [0.017] [0.045] [0.015] [0.070]** [0.042]*** [0.012] [0.014] [0.036] 
Income 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.008 
 
[0.013] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.006] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] 
I(t) -0.054 0.013 0.010 0.004 0.025 -0.035 -0.058 -0.014 0.010 -0.032 
 
[0.100] [0.009] [0.020] [0.020] [0.014]* [0.097] [0.036] [0.008]* [0.013] [0.059] 
I(t-1) 0.126 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.035 0.078 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.023 
 
[0.146] [0.020] [0.008] [0.037] [0.017]** [0.088] [0.036] [0.010] [0.008] [0.028] 
I(t-2) -0.146 0.002 -0.010 -0.071 0.036 -0.160 0.037 -0.006 -0.023 -0.054 
 




      
0.003 
   
[0.008]*** 
      
[0.046] 
Pop_Density 2.011 0.282 0.024 0.476 -0.123 1.462 0.018 0.004 0.240 1.007 
 
[1.253] [0.079]*** [0.072] [0.417] [0.118] [0.521]*** [0.383] [0.097] [0.218] [0.556]* 
Under 15 28.081 -2.048 -1.941 6.185 -2.197 11.155 -10.974 0.739 -4.763 -8.260 
 
[8.420]*** [1.681] [1.571] [4.525] [1.539] [5.158]** [6.211]* [1.803] [1.655]*** [4.594]* 
Above 65 -50.685 2.622 0.803 -6.435 3.952 8.788 -9.938 -4.918 5.420 10.409 
 
[30.504] [2.375] [1.574] [7.776] [3.237] [15.853] [8.352] [2.609]* [5.053] [11.878] 
AR(1) 0.002 0.011 0.033 0.005 0.012 0.038 0.045 0.009 0.013 0.043 
AR(2) 0.074 0.159 0.113 0.121 0.246 0.458 0.745 0.818 0.586 0.348 
Sargan Test 0.606 0.321 0.232 0.470 0.234 0.207 0.391 0.854 0.227 0.519 
 
Notes:  
(1) Column variables are categories of public expenditures for state and local government. 
(2) All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in brackets, robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 









 2.4: Difference GMM Treating Incentives as Endogenous 
 
 
Direct_Exp Admin Corrections Elem Edu Higher Edu 
Health 
& Human Highways 
Police 
& Fire Sanitation Utilities 
Y(t-1) 0.810 0.822 0.669 0.778 0.839 0.775 0.550 0.649 0.678 0.333 
 
[0.069]*** [0.103]*** [0.051]*** [0.053]*** [0.069]*** [0.115]*** [0.118]*** [0.072]*** [0.085]*** [0.274] 
Grants 0.541 0.006 -0.006 0.061 -0.004 0.197 0.132 0.016 0.001 -0.043 
 
[0.104]*** [0.021] [0.016] [0.042] [0.016] [0.063]*** [0.039]*** [0.011] [0.011] [0.035] 
Income 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.008* 0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
 
[0.012] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004]* 
I(t) -0.259 0.002 0.010 0.013 0.062 -0.073 -0.084 -0.019 -0.002 -0.141 
 
[0.177] [0.010] [0.019] [0.022] [0.035]* [0.085] [0.071] [0.007]*** [0.019] [0.099] 
I(t-1) 0.036 0.012 -0.001 0.012 0.050 0.062 -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.030 
 
[0.152] [0.020] [0.008] [0.037] [0.015]*** [0.076] [0.024] [0.010] [0.009] [0.033] 
I(t-2) -0.193 -0.002 -0.011 -0.060 0.049 -0.169 0.031 -0.009 -0.029 -0.058 
 




      
0.011 
   
[0.009]*** 
      
[0.069] 
Pop_Density 3.039 0.352 0.037 0.895** -0.105 1.510 0.016 0.124 0.189 0.705 
 
[1.111]*** [0.111]*** [0.066] [0.414] [0.124] [0.415]*** [0.357] [0.080] [0.163] [0.441] 
Under 15 20.631 -2.537 -1.925 4.324 -2.429 11.073 -8.695 0.248 -3.606 -5.725 
 
[9.716]** [1.982] [1.562] [4.933] [1.775] [4.704]** [6.265] [1.507] [1.311]*** [3.835] 
Above 65 -37.754 3.775 0.508 -0.908 4.610 10.505 -10.579 -3.838 4.435 7.879 
 
[19.499]* [3.217] [1.601] [8.679] [3.430] [12.480] [7.944] [3.158] [3.927] [8.399] 
AR(1) 0.001 0.006 0.028 0.006 0.014 0.018 0.037 0.005 0.004 0.042 
AR(2) 0.103 0.17 0.108 0.019 0.253 0.477 0.736 0.853 0.675 0.202 
Sargan Test 0.276 0.344 0.251 0.087 0.199 0.178 0.532 0.085 0.430 0.333 
 
Notes:  
(1) Column variables are categories of public expenditures for state and local government. 
(2) All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in brackets, robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 









Table 2.5: System GMM Treating Incentives as Exogenous 
 
 
Direct_Exp Admin Corrections Elem Edu Higher Edu 
Health 
& Human Highways 
Police 
& Fire Sanitation Utilities 
Y(t-1) 1.173 0.992 0.973 0.968 1.008 1.000 0.926 1.039 0.954 0.962 
 
[0.179]*** [0.032]*** [0.025]*** [0.016]*** [0.026]*** [0.032]*** [0.031]*** [0.010]*** [0.067]*** [0.037]*** 
Grants -0.253 -0.001 0.000 0.016 0.005 0.030 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.003 
 
[0.346] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.009] [0.023] [0.011]** [0.002] [0.003] [0.011] 
Income -0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
[0.033] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.001] 
I(t) -0.237 0.003 0.024 0.008 0.006 -0.016 -0.076 -0.012 0.006 -0.023 
 
[0.187] [0.008] [0.014] [0.010] [0.011] [0.038] [0.025]*** [0.010] [0.009] [0.036] 
I(t-1) -0.342 -0.001 0.009 -0.006 0.022 0.051 0.019 -0.009 -0.011 -0.023 
 
[0.427] [0.009] [0.005]* [0.016] [0.008]** [0.061] [0.016] [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.013]* 
I(t-2) -0.344 -0.004 -0.005 -0.072 0.017 -0.154 0.036 -0.002 -0.026 0.027 
 




       
   
[0.006]*** 
       
Pop_Density 0.103 0.001 -0.003 0.031 -0.002 0.025 -0.012 0.000 0.003 0.002 
 
[0.077] [0.003] [0.002] [0.011]*** [0.004] [0.014]* [0.007] [0.001] [0.005] [0.009] 
Under 15 -15.436 -0.330 -0.518 -3.585 -1.411 0.631 0.120 -0.089 -0.457 0.035 
 
[14.865] [0.003] [0.289]* [1.777]** [0.841] [2.549] [1.154] [0.390] [0.390] [1.248] 
Above 65 -1.810 -0.185 -0.635 -2.231 -0.686 0.157 0.082 -0.205 0.084 -0.011 
 
[7.908] [0.568] [0.185]*** [0.814]*** [0.473] [1.787] [0.574] [0.217] [0.308] [0.889] 
AR(1) 0.002 0.009 0.033 0.009 0.024 0.019 0.034 0.005 0.001 0.034 
AR(2) 0.179 0.171 0.101 0.020 0.267 0.496 0.732 0.745 0.716 0.170 
Sargan Test 0.565 0.182 0.529 0.345 0.207 0.173 0.493 0.434 0.585 0.791 
 
Notes:  
(1) Column variables are categories of public expenditures for state and local government. Constant is omitted from the table. 
(2) All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in brackets, robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 









Table 2.6: System GMM Treating Incentives as Endogenous 
 
 
Direct_Exp Admin Corrections Elem Edu Higher Edu 
Health  
& Human Highways 
Police  
& Fire Sanitation Utilities 
Y(t-1) 0.996 0.997 0.963 0.969 1.021 1.050 0.924 1.018 0.975 1.009 
 
[0.059]*** [0.024]*** [0.020]*** [0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.034]*** [0.023]*** [0.010]*** [0.015]*** [0.009]*** 
Grants 0.193 0.005 0.000 0.023 -0.001 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.002 0.005 
 
[0.121] [0.004] [0.003] [0.011]** [0.008] [0.018] [0.012]* [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] 
Income -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
[0.013] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]* [0.002] [0.001] [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000] 
I(t) -1.493 -0.032 -0.016 -0.093 0.065 0.014 -0.097 -0.035 0.008 -0.022 
 
[0.982] [0.036] [0.020] [0.077] [0.030]** [0.084] [0.077] [0.015]** [0.007] [0.037] 
I(t-1) -0.056 -0.007 0.013 -0.007 0.017 0.046 0.027 -0.006 -0.014 -0.033 
 
[0.161] [0.010] [0.005]** [0.024] [0.008]** [0.060] [0.018] [0.006] [0.004]*** [0.011]*** 
I(t-2) -0.339 -0.008 -0.003 -0.081 0.020 -0.167 0.038 -0.006 -0.027 0.021 
 




       
   
[0.006]** 
       
Pop_Density 0.110 0.001 -0.001 0.034 -0.002 0.025 -0.011 0.002 0.002 0.007 
 
[0.053]** [0.004] [0.002] [0.011]*** [0.004] [0.013]* [0.007] [0.001] [0.003] [0.006] 
Under 15 -0.864 0.018 -0.705 -3.208 -1.356 0.423 -0.196 0.124 -0.475 -0.224 
 
[9.325] [0.004] [0.308]** [1.906] [0.995] [2.450] [1.030] [0.515] [0.432] [0.638] 
Above 65 -6.384 -0.223 -0.755 -2.565 -0.466 0.209 -0.048 -0.194 0.111 0.196 
 
[4.914] [0.630] [0.204]*** [0.819]*** [0.526] [1.758] [0.499] [0.257] [0.295] [0.389] 
AR(1) 0.002 0.012 0.033 0.011 0.028 0.022 0.034 0.006 0.000 0.031 
AR(2) 0.269 0.167 0.107 0.117 0.243 0.490 0.721 0.993 0.502 0.161 
Sargan Test 0.640 0.226 0.709 0.132 0.707 0.185 0.884 0.185 0.219 0.380 
 
Notes:  
(1) Column variables are categories of public expenditures for state and local government. Constant is omitted from the table. 
(2) All regressions include state and year fixed effects.Standard errors are in brackets, robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 




Chapter 3: Strategic Interaction and Economic Development 
Incentives Policy: Evidence from U.S. States 
3.1 Introduction 
State and local governments spend billions of dollars each year on economic 
development incentives (EDI), often in an attempt to attract or retain investment, create 
jobs and ultimately stimulate growth. According to New York Times, Texas offers the 
most incentives, exceeding 19 billion dollars a year, while Alaska, West Virginia and 
Nebraska award the most in terms of per capita. Despite of the extensive body of 
research on EDI, no consensus has been reached about the efficacy of such policies 
(Peters and Fisher, 2004; Patrick, 2014). Both proponents and opponents of EDI 
programs have offered theoretical, empirical, and/or case study evidence to support 
their claims.  
A related but much smaller literature examines factors motivating communities 
to engage in offering economic development incentives. Economic, political and 
demographic characteristics have been examined as determinants (Felix and Hines, 
2013). Important as these factors are, my paper highlights another determinant of EDI 
spending at the state level: the EDI spending of neighboring states.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that EDI expenditure within one state does affect 
that of another. For example, a few months after Kansas recruited AMC Entertainment, 
which moved barely across the border from Missouri, with a $36 million award, 
Missouri attracted Applebee’s headquarters from Kansas.
26
 Border wars like these are 
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not limited to the middle part of the country.
27
 The creation of the Texas Enterprise 
Fund (TEF), the largest discretionary fund to entice companies to relocate, has inspired 
all of Texas’ neighbors to imitate. Such interstate competition has become a rule rather 
than exception. As a result, every state nowadays has at least one type of incentives 
programs (Truitt, 2004; Pew Center Study, 2012). 
This rivalry among states has been extensively discussed in academia (Ellis and 
Rogers, 2000; Patrick, 2014). Some believe that the use of incentives targeted as 
specific businesses induces a loss to the overall economy at the national level and hence 
have called for the Congress to take action to “end the economic war among states” 
(Rolnick and Burstein, 1995). Others have worried about whether such competition 
simply leads to a reshuffling of business locations and under-provision of public goods 
(Bartik, 1991; Fish and Peters, 1997; Gorin, 2008; Wang, 2015). Surprisingly, there is 
little empirical research to substantiate the existence and the extent of policy interaction 
in incentives competition.  
Although public economics has long incorporated strategic interaction in 
theoretical modelling (Brueckner, 2003), most empirical research focuses on 
communities’ own characteristics in analyzing EDI activities. Man (1999) and Byrne 
(2005) are the only researchers explicitly accounting for policy interaction in the study 
of communities’ decision to adopt tax increment financing (TIF), a specific type of 
economic development incentives. The aforementioned anecdotal evidence suggests 
that EDI competition is also relevant at the state level. A more realistic and natural 
model of the decision making process therefore considers influence of EDI spending 
                                                          
27
 Tax battle in the Northeast (New York versus New Jersey): 
http://www.nytimes.com/video/business/100000001936106/tax-battle-in-the-northeast.html   
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decision of neighboring states. This paper examines EDI spending at the state level and 
accounts for strategic interaction using spatial econometrics technique.  
It extends existing literature in a number of ways. With the benefit a national 
search engine for EDI, I verify the existence and estimate the extent of EDI policy 
interaction in incentives expenditures at the state level. In addition, panel data across 
states allows for a more generalizable analysis compared with prior research that 
focuses on a specific geographic area and/or a specific type of incentive programs. 
Further, it extends Byrne’s (2005) spatial econometrics framework by incorporating 
both state and year dummies to mitigate concerns associated with potential omitted 
variables bias. This paper further contributes to the literature by shedding light on 
whether or not interstate EDI competition is more intense after the 2008 financial crisis 
and if political cycle plays a role in EDI competition.  
Using a sample across 22 U.S. states, I find that states appear to choose their 
EDI spending levels strategically during the period 2000-2011. More specifically, states 
respond positively to EDI spending level set in their neighbors: EDI spending increases 
in neighboring states are matched by higher EDI spending in the home state. The 
magnitudes of response cluster around 56 to 60 cents for each dollar’s increase 
depending on the definition of neighbors. Additional evidence suggests that the EDI 
competition has not become more intense after the most recent financial crisis states, 
nor is election cycle the driving force of EDI competition. The overall results indicate 
that EDI are used as a way to compete for capital and jobs against neighboring states, 
most close in nature to tax competition. This paper contributes to the heated debate over 
incentives use and helps to better understand the nature of spillovers regarding EDI use. 
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Results of this paper provide valuable guidance to policymakers. The remainder of the 
paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of existing literature. 
Section III introduces the empirical model and estimation challenges. The data are 
described in Section IV. Section V presents empirical findings. Robustness checks and 
extensions are discussed in Section VI, and. Section VII concludes. 
3.2 Overview of Prior Research 
Fiscal policy interdependence has long interested researchers (Brueckner, 2003; 
Revelli, 2005). Several channels contribute to the observed policy interdependence. 
Jurisdictions may compete against each other for mobile resources, hence setting policy 
variables interdependently or strategically, as highlighted in the extensive literature on 
“tax competition” and “welfare competition”. The former is attributable to the fact that 
local governments compete for mobile resources (e.g. capital) through taxation. Their 
tax base, therefore, is affected by both their own and their neighbors’ tax rates. To avoid 
pushing away taxpayers, communities set their tax rates strategically. Evidence of this 
mechanism is well documented in the literature (Wilson 1999; Brueckner and Saavedra 
2001; Rork, 2003; Revelli 2005). Welfare competition arises from the fear that too 
generous benefits would lead to an inflow of welfare recipients. Policymakers, thus, 
compete to lower their welfare benefits, resulting in a ‘‘race to the bottom.’’ Figlio, 
Kolpin and Reid (1999) and Saavedra (2000) among others have found that generosity 
of welfare benefits is determined strategically based on the potential of interstate 
migration. In particular, Figlio, Kolpin and Reid (1999) find that states are more 
responsive to decreases in neighbors’ benefits than increases.  
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Policy interdependence can also be associated with externalities of public goods, 
e.g. spillover effects. Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) are among the first to incorporate 
spatial interdependence into analysis and find positive interactions in public 
expenditures using state level data from the US. The evidence of spillover effects also 
exists at the local level and beyond U.S. borders. Murdoch, Rahmatian, and Thayer 
(1993) find positive spillovers in municipal recreational expenditures in California, and 
Kelejian and Robinson (1993) find positive spillover for county level police 
expenditures. Further, a number of studies in European countries provide support for 
spatial interdependence on the expenditure policies (Silva, Beiga, and Portela, 2011; 
Stastna, 2009; Foucalt, Madies, and Paty, 2008; Werck, Heyndels, and Geys, 2008; 
Redoano, 2007; Olle 2006; Lundberg, 2006). Revelli (2003), however, points out the 
importance of incorporating vertical externalities among different layers of authorities 
when estimating magnitude of horizontal externalities. His paper concludes that the 
observed spatial autocorrelation in English district expenditures can largely be 
attributable to common reaction to fiscal policies from the higher level of authority 
instead of strategic interaction. More recently, Burge and Rogers (2011) also consider 
both vertical and horizontal fiscal spillovers in local option sales taxes (LOSTs). 
Another mechanism driving fiscal policy interaction is political yardstick 
competition, where imperfectly informed voters use policies of other jurisdictions as a 
benchmark to evaluate policy efficiency in own jurisdictions. This information 
asymmetry compels incumbents to mimic policies in other jurisdictions. Evidence 
supporting the yardstick competition hypotheses has been revealed by Besley and Case 
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(1995), Bordingnon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003), Olle, (2003), and Ermini and 
Santolini (2010). 
Regarding the literature on EDI, substantial empirical research has been devoted 
to the efficacy of EDI. Peters and Fisher (2004) and Patrick (2014) provide overviews. 
In contrast, the literature on factors influencing EDI participation or level of spending is 
very thin. Felix and Hines (2013) investigates characteristics distinguishing the US 
communities that offer tax-based business incentives from those who do not and what 
factors are associated with communities that offer TIF versus tax abatements and credits. 
They find cities and counties are more likely to offer business incentives if they are 
more heavily populated, located close to state boundaries, have low income, 
concentration of manufacturing industries, and troubled political cultures. Additionally, 
they conclude that TIFs are less likely to be used the poorest communities (whose 
household income is less than $25,000). Man (1999) and Byrne (2005) explicitly 
control for the possible strategic interaction in municipality’s adoption decision of tax 
increment financing (TIF). Both papers find evidence of strategic interaction regarding 
adoption decisions: the former considers cities in Indiana while the latter examines the 
Chicago metro area. In addition, both papers find that fiscal stress is a determinant of 
TIF adoption. This paper builds on and extends the work of Byrne (2005) and Felix and 
Hines (2003) by exploring the strategic interaction in EDI spending at the state level. 
3.3 Empirical Approach 
3.3.1 Basic Estimation Framework 
The public finance literature frequently employs spatial analysis (Brueckner, 
2003; Revelli, 2005). When the focus is spatial interaction among jurisdictions, the 
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spatial lag model is often used. The basic estimation framework is illustrated in 
Equation [1], where the neighboring states’ EDI expenditures serve as an additional 
explanatory variable for home state’s incentives spending: 
[1] 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the per capita incentives spending in state 𝑖 in year 𝑡, while (𝐼𝑇⨂ 𝑊𝑁)𝑦𝑗𝑡  is a 
weighted average of neighboring states’ per capita incentives expenditures. The 
structure of weighting matrix (𝑊𝑁) is determined by neighboring criterion described in 
detail below. 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector containing economic, political and demographic 
characteristics that are typically thought to affect EDI spending (Byrne, 2005; Felix and 
Hines, 2013). State fixed effects ( 𝛼𝑖  ) control for time invariant state specific 
characteristics, while time fixed effects ( 𝜃𝑡 ) account for common shocks that affect all 
states in a specific year (e.g. economic cycles and trends in EDI spending).  
Equation [1] implies that EDI spending in a particular state-year depends on a 
weighted average of neighboring states’ EDI spending and other conditioning variables. 
𝛽2 is the autoregressive parameter, the parameter of interest here. It is also known as the 
coefficient of the reaction function. When it is estimated to be positive and significant, 
it implies that states increase their spending on EDI when their neighbors do so, i.e. the 
existence of incentives competition.  
3.3.2 Specification of Weighting Matrix 
Identification of neighbors, i.e. weighting matrix (𝑊𝑁), is key to spatial analysis. 
Due to the infeasibility of estimating the weighting matrix, it is up to the researcher to 
specify W prior to estimation (Case, Hines and Rosen, 1993; Brueckner, 2003). Hence, 
the prior beliefs about how economic agents interact with each other are crucial. 
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However, there is no clear guidance about what criteria should be used. This paper 
explores a number of weighting schemes to allow for different patterns of spatial 
interaction in an attempt to better understand the contributing forces underlying EDI 
competition. 
Geographic proximity has frequently been used as a starting point in spatial 
economics literature. The major justification lies in that information and resources flow 
more easily among nearby localities. There are several ways to assign weights based 
geographic proximity alone.  
This paper starts with the most intuitive one, a simple contiguity weighting 
matrix, which defines neighbors as the ones sharing a common border. The elements of 
W, therefore, are specified as follows.  
 𝜔𝑖𝑗 =       1, if state i and j shares a border 
                 0, if state i and j does not share a border 
Consequently, all diagonal elements of 𝑊𝑁, 𝜔𝑖𝑖, are zero. Following the convention in 
the literature, 𝑊𝑁  is row-standardized such that the sum of each row in W is one, 
meaning the sum of the weights for each state equals one. Take the state of Michigan 
for example. Each of its neighbors is given a weight of 1/3 because there are three states 
bordering Michigan (Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio). 
An extension of the simple contiguity weighting matrix is the distance-based 
weighting matrix, where state 𝑖’s EDI spending is affected by EDI expenditures of all 
the other states in the sample, but in inverse proportion to their distances to 𝑖. Inverse 
distance weights allow the effect to decrease with distance. Again, all diagonal elements 
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 , where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the 
point distance between centroids of two states.  
A variety of weighting matrices other than simply geography-based ones have 
also been adopted in the literature. Following Rork (2003) and Baicker (2005), I also 
consider population contiguity weighting matrix. This refines the simple contiguity 
weighting matrix by assigning weights based on the relative size of population among 
bordering states: states with higher population are assigned with greater weights.
 28
 
Mathematically, off-diagonal elements are defined as 𝜔𝑖𝑗 =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑗
, with i ≠ j. 
29
 
Consider the state of Michigan again. The weight assigned to Ohio, for example, is its 
population divided by the sum of the populations of Wisconsin, Indiana and Ohio. 
Hence, the weight or importance of Ohio as Michigan’s neighbor is close to 1/2 instead 
of 1/3 due to its relative larger population.  
Further, it is possible that policy interaction in EDI spending is less determined 
by geographic proximity but more by economic similarity. States may watch more 
closely and subsequently be more responsive to the actions of states that share similar 
economic characteristics regardless of geographic distance. To this end, I experiment 
with weights based on economic proximity as well. I construct an inverse income 
distance weighting matrix, which is the same as the inverse distance weighting matrix 
above except that 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is replaced with the Euclidean distance in average per capita 
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 The population for each state is averaged over the entire sample period (2000-2012). Therefore, W is 
constructed to be constant over time. 
29
 In addition to contiguity weights based on population, this paper also experimented with weighing 
schemes based on income, corruption, manufacturing share of employment, infrastructure spending, 




income between states i and j. Using Euclidean distance helps to mitigate the 
endogeneity of W (Xiao, 2014). Again, Euclidean distances based on corruption, 
manufacturing share of employment, infrastructure spending, education and higher 
education spending are also considered. 
3.3.3 Estimation Problems 
Three problems arise in the estimation of the spatial econometric framework in 
equation [1]: endogeneity of neighbors' incentives spending, potential spatial error 
dependence, and possible correlation between other control variables and the error term 
(Brueckner, 2003). 
In the presence of strategic interaction when states do react to each other’s 
incentives expenditures, incentive expenditures in different states are jointly determined 
in Nash equilibria. This simultaneity leads to the correlation of 𝑊𝑌𝑖𝑡 and the error term 
on the right-hand sided of equation [1]. Endogeneity causes the OLS estimator to be 
both biased and inconsistent. Existing literature addresses endogeneity using a 
Maximum likelihood (MLE) estimator, which removes the dependent variables on the 
RHS through inverting the system, or an instrumental variable (IV) approach 
(Brueckner, 2003).  
Possible spatial error dependence further complicates the estimation of equation 
[1]. This problem arises when spatially interdependent variables are omitted. When this 
is unaddressed in the estimation, false evidence of interdependence may occur as a 
result. In this circumstance, the error vector follows a spatial lag process as below, 𝜐 is 
white noise.  
[2] = 𝜋𝑊 + 𝜐 
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MLE is one way to circumvent this problem. The computational challenge of MLE 
coupled with the Jarque-Bera LM tests’ rejection of the null hypothesis that errors are 
normally distributed for my sample dismissed MLE as an appropriate procedure 
(Gebremariam et al, 2012). IV estimation provides an alternative that does not require 
distributional assumptions on the error term. The IV estimator is argued to be consistent 
even in the presence of spatial error dependence (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). Therefore, 
I adopt IV estimator in this paper. To this end, an instrument correlated with neighbors’ 
EDI but uncorrelated with the error term needs to be found. One commonly used source 
of variation is neighbors’ control variables ( 𝑋𝑖𝑡) . Weighted average of neighbors’ 
control variables are created as instruments using the same weighting matrix (Brueckner, 
2003). 
A third problem in the estimation of [1] is the potential correlation of other 
control variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡) and the error term, which has been typically ignored by previous 
studies. Brueckner (2003) admits that finding suitable instruments is a feasible yet very 
difficult endeavor. The use of panel data, however, is suggested as an alternative. All 
time invariant characteristics are captured in individual specific intercepts. The 
correlation is largely removed even though some might remain due to time varying 
unobserved characteristics not being purged by mean deviation transformation.
30
 To 
further mitigate this concern, I estimate Equation [3], which uses one year lagged values 
of control variables that are thought most likely to be endogenous (Brown et al, 2009).
31
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 In addition, Brueckner (2003) claims that panel data helps to mitigate the concern of spatial error 
dependence because fixed effect would absorb much of the error interdependence. 
31
 All covariates but federal grants enter the regression as one-year lagged values. For one, EDI spending 
does not seem to influence federal grants conceptually, hence there does not seem to be need to lag the 
variable of federal grants like others. For another, results do not change qualitatively when federal grants 
in the previous year are used in the regression except that coefficients on lagged federal grants are no 
longer statistically significant. Whether personal income in incorporated as lagged value or not does not 
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[3] 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 +𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖+𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Measures of Economic Development Incentives 
Given that the focus of this paper is to investigate if states’ incentives 
expenditures are affected by those of their neighbors, good measures of incentives 
spending are critical. However, existing literature establishes that ideal measures for 
EDI do not exist (Fisher and Peters, 1997; Patrick, 2014). Program counts, a frequently 
used measure in earlier studies, can be severely misleading about the generosity of EDI 
offered, and are thus inappropriate for the purpose of this paper. Another commonly 
adopted measure is states’ economic development agency spending. This too is 
unsatisfying because development agency funds can be used for noneconomic activities 
and funding for EDI may come from alternative sources.
32
 Conclusions based on a 
measure like this are suspicious. 
As an alternative, my study exploits Subsidy Tracker, a new exciting database 
on economic development incentives gathered by Good Jobs First.
33
 Subsidy Tracker is 
the first national search engine for state and local economic development incentives. It 
brings together public records of incentives granted to businesses and includes 12 broad 
categories of both tax and non-tax incentive programs (tax credits/rebates, property tax 
abatements, megadeal, grants/low-cost loans, enterprise zones, tax increment financing, 
training reimbursements, cost reimbursements, infrastructure assistance, industrial 
                                                                                                                                                                          
affect results qualitatively except that coefficient estimates are negative and significant when it is entered 
as contemporaneous values. 
32
 Gorin (2008) provides an excellent example from Oklahoma. Notably, the data source for state 
economic development agency expenditure, i.e. the website for the National Association of State 
Development Agencies (NASDA), does not exist anymore. 
33
 Good Jobs First (GJF) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan group that promotes accountability in economic 
development. For more information, please refer to http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/about-us. 
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revenue bonds, tax credits/rebates and grants, tax credits/rebates and property tax 
abatements). It includes the actual dollar value of incentives granted, providing a 
measure of EDI spending that was not available for previous research. 
Despite not being inclusive of all incentives programs and the granted values, it 
is still the most comprehensive database of incentives available (Kenyon, Langley, and 
Paquin, 2012).
34
 This paper utilizes the Subsidy Tracker database (June 09, 2014 
version) and aggregates subsidy values by state-year so that each observation is the 
value of subsidies granted by a state in a specific year. 
35
 
3.4.2 Other Variables 
The conditioning variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡  of equation [1] largely follow previous 
literature and consist of economic, political and demographic characteristics of states 
(Byrnes, 2005; Felix and Hines, 2013). 
Since EDI is extensively used by policymakers for employment promotion, we 
would expect states with high unemployment and substantial manufacturing 
employment to be more active in incentives use. Unemployment rate and manufacturing 
share of employment are, therefore, included in addition to per capita federal grants and 
per capita income which account for resources available to state and local governments. 
Following Felix and Hines (2013), per capita state tax revenue, top statutory state 
corporate income tax rate, general state sales tax rate, top statutory state personal 
income tax rate are incorporated because how much EDI states are willing and able to 
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 Harpel (2014) has a detailed discussion about Subsidy Tracker. 
http://www.smartincentives.org/blogs/blog/14754093-good-jobs-first-and-subsidy-tracker-2-0. 
35
 One downside of Subsidy Tracker database is that it did not try to annualize the amount of award for 
multi-year packages. But since it is consistent for all states and years and the focus of this paper is to 




offer depend on existing tax structure as well. As pointed out in the literature, public 
goods like infrastructure also play a role in business location decisions (Fisher and 
Peters, 1997). We would expect states with better infrastructure to be more attractive to 
the businesses, so they may not need to offer as much incentives to lure investments.
36
 
Therefore, I include the ‘infrastructure’ variable, expressed as a percentage: core 




Certain political variables have also been hypothesized to affect incentives use. 
More specifically, Felix and Hines (2013) find that communities with troubled political 
culture are more likely to offer tax-based incentives; while Jansa and Gray (2014) 
uncover evidence that more campaign contributions from business results in higher 
subsidy spending. My specification includes ‘corruption’ variable, calculated as the 
number of federal public corruption convictions per 1,000,000 residents in each state 
(Felix and Hines, 2013). Election cycles could also contribute to variations in EDI use, 
which is discussed in more detail in Section V. 
For demographic characteristics, the fraction of population above 65 years old is 
included because the elder population may be more active voters (Rork, 2003). 
Hypothesis tests indicate that population density and percentage of population below 15 
are not determinants of EDI spending; therefore, they are dropped from the regression. 
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 Chris Cummiskey, head of Georgia’s Department of Economic Development, believes that “Georgia 
would pick up most of the business in the southeast even without incentives given its infrastructure”.  
“Sweet land of subsidy”: http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21576669-downturn-has-forced-
states-be-savvier-and-more-careful-about-providing-tax. 
37
 Following Felix and Hines (2013), core infrastructure comprises of air transportation, general public 
buildings, regular highways, toll highways, private transit subsidies, parking facilities, sewerage, solid 
waste, sea and inland port facilities, water utilities, electric utilities, gas utilities, and transit utilities. 
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When added, estimated coefficients are insignificant and do not affect overall results 
qualitatively.  
Given that the use of EDI can potentially affect the above-mentioned 
conditioning variables, one year lag of all covariates except federal grants are used in 
estimation to avoid contemporaneous correlation between control variables and the 
error term. 
3.4.3 Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
Government finance data (federal grants, infrastructure spending, state tax 
revenue), manufacturing share of employment and demographic data are obtained from 
US Census, while personal income and unemployment rates are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). Top statutory state corporate income tax rate and general 
state sales tax rate data are drawn from Tax Foundation, while top statutory state 
personal income tax rate data are collected from Tax Policy Center. The U.S. 
Department of Justice provides reports of federal public corruption convictions. Control 
variables are matched with EDI data. All dollar values are expressed in per capita and 
converted to real values (using 1982—1984 as the base year). The requirement of a 
balanced panel for estimation restricts the sample to 22 states over the period 2000-
2011. Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 provide a map and a list of states covered in this sample, 
respectively. Geographically, the sample covers states mostly in the Northeast, Midwest 
and the South region. Economically, these 22 states account for about 60% of all EDI 
offered from 2000 to 2011 in US states according to the Subsidy Tracker database. 
Table 3.2 provides variable descriptions and data sources. 
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Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.3. The dataset contains 264 
observations. The descriptive statistics indicate considerable variation in EDI spending, 
personal income as well as other control variables. A closer examination of the sample 
reveals that per capita EDI spending ranges over the time period from $0.004 
(Louisiana in 2010) to $351.87 (Louisiana in 2004) with an average of $18.77 across all 
states and years. The states having high EDI spending in all years are Louisiana, 
Michigan, Kentucky, and New York. This is somewhat expected as Michigan and New 
York also have the highest manufacturing share of employment during the sample 
period, whereas New York and Louisiana are also among the top states in receiving 
federal grants. The average manufacturing share of employment is 12.92 percent, 
ranging from 4 to 24 percent. Corruption rate varies extensively with the average being 
3.7 convictions per 1,000,000 residents. The highest occurred in Virginia in 2007 and 
the lowest was in Michigan in 1999. Infrastructure spending as a percentage of total 
spending remains pretty stable for sample states across the years, with average about 15 
percent. 
3.5 Results 
As mentioned in Section III, instrumental variable approach is chosen over MLE 
to estimate the spatial lag model [3] because the Jarque-Bera test rejects the hypothesis 
of normally distributed error terms.
38
 Home states’ EDI expenditures are regressed on 
neighboring states’ EDI spending and conditioning variables. The regression 
coefficients and their associated standard errors (in parentheses) are reported in Table 
                                                          
38
When the baseline model is estimated using MLE, overall results remain qualitatively similar. 
Compared with IV estimation, coefficients on the key parameter (𝜌 ) are generally smaller, ranging from 





 Column [1] shows the baseline results using simple contiguity matrix and 
indicates that states do respond to their neighboring states’ incentives expenditures. A 
dollar increase from the average neighbor’s EDI spending raises the home state’s 
incentives spending by approximately 57 cents. In terms of elasticity, states increase 
their incentives spending by 0.54% in response to a 1% increase the average neighbor’s 
incentives spending. 
As mentioned above, there is good reason to believe that states consider others 
with similar economic structure as salient competitors. Hence, this papers experiments 
with a variety of different definitions for “neighborliness”. Columns [2] to [9] of Table 
3.4 reports estimated coefficients under inverse distance weights, contiguity weights 
based on population, personal income, median household income, corruption, 
manufacturing share of employment, infrastructure spending, education and higher 
education spending respectively. Table 3.5 (except the last column, [8]) presents results 
under Euclidean distance weights based on the same political and economic 
characteristics in Table 3.4. The major difference is that in Table 3.5 every state is 
assumed to be a neighbor of the other states, while in Table 3.4 contiguity weights 
consider only bordering states as neighbors. The coefficients from various weighting 
schemes are similar in sign, magnitude, and significance. Overall the models explain 
about 35 percent of the variation in state-level per capita EDI spending.  
Regardless of definitions of neighbor, estimates for the parameter of interest is 
positive and statistically different from 0, ranging from 0.37 under population 
contiguity weights to 0.81 under inverse distance weights, which means that a dollar 
increase in the average neighboring states’ incentives spending induces an increase in 
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Asterisks denote significance levels at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
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incentives spending in the home state of between 37 cents to 81 cents.
40
 This result 
suggests that state and local governments use EDI to lure business to locate or expand 
within their borders. When a state increases EDI spending, it puts pressure on nearby 
states and propels them to spend more on EDI as well. The corresponding elasticity 
ranges from 0.37 to 0.83. The elasticity estimates are all less than 1, which says despite 
states increase their EDI spending when their neighbors do so, the response is relatively 
unresponsive to neighboring states’ increase in incentives spending.  
Despite overall results confirm the existence of policy interaction in EDI 
spending with most estimates clustering 0.56 and 0.6, the smallest estimate comes under 
population contiguity weights. It is also worth noting that coefficient estimates 
considering neighbors as ones beyond immediate borders (reported in Table 3.5) are 
generally larger than those of Table 3.4.  
Given that the focus of the paper is the spatial autoregressive parameter, I focus 
on the marginal effects of the control variables on own state’s dependent variable 
instead of computing direct and indirect effects. Coefficient estimates for the 
conditioning variables generally have the expected signs and similar magnitudes 
regardless of weighting schemes. 
We can see that regardless of the choice of weighting schemes, grants positively 
affect how much EDI are offered. A higher unemployment rate and manufacturing 
share of employment in the previous year have been found to be associated with the 
more EDI spending in the current year, consistent with the findings of Felix and Hines 
(2013). This supports the popular belief that job creation is a major reason for 
                                                          
40
 These estimates are of comparable magnitudes to literature on spatial interaction. For example, Case, 
Hines and Rosen (1993) find that states respond to a dollar increase in their neighbors’ spending by over 
70 cents, whereas Baicker (2005) estimates the magnitude to be almost 90 cents. 
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policymakers to offer EDI. The only demographic characteristic that significantly 
affects EDI spending is the percentage of population above 65. The lagged elder 
population proportion is negatively associated with incentives spending. The 
coefficients on tax variables are not statistically significant except top state personal 
income tax rates. It seems that states with higher personal income tax rates offer less 




3.6 Robustness Checks and Extensions 
Given the significant results of all the different neighborliness definitions, some 
might suspect that the idiosyncrasy of the data or the spatial econometrics framework 
will always produce a statistically significant coefficient estimate for the autoregressive 
parameter. Following Case, Hines and Rosen (1993), I run a falsification test by 
constructing a weighting matrix based on a ridiculous neighboring criterion, 
alphabetical order of state names. More specifically, 𝜔𝑖𝑗 equals 1 if states 𝑖 and 𝑗 are 
next to each other in alphabetical order list of states. In the case where a state’s 
alphabetical neighbors are not included in my sample, its neighbor is designated as the 
state immediately before or after its alphabetical neighbor. Table 3.5 Column [8] reports 
regression results based on this “false” spatial weighting matrix. The coefficient 
estimate on neighboring states’ incentives spending is no longer statistically significant, 
while coefficients for control variable still have the same signs as baseline estimation. 
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 When corruption and infrastructure spending are included as contemporaneous values, the former has a 
positive effect on incentives spending, while the latter has a negative effect. This indicates that states with 
more troubled political culture spend more on EDI, while better infrastructure states spend less, consistent 
with the findings of Felix and Hines (2013). 
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This further strengthens our confidence in the evidence of incentives competition. It is 
unlikely obtained due to the arbitrary nature of the data or econometrics method. 
In addition to falsification test, I also extend the baseline model in an attempt to 
investigate whether incentives competition has become more intense in recent years, 
especially after the 2008 financial crisis.  
According to the Economist, “The cash crunch following the downturn led some 
states to spend more on economic development in order to lure businesses. It has led 
others to save precious funds by tightening economic development budgets.” 
42
 It would 
be interesting to investigate if incentives competition among states has intensified or 
weakened since the 2008 financial crisis. To this end, the baseline regression model is 
modified as follows. 
[4] 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝛾𝐷2008 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝐷2008 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
 𝐷2008 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for years after and including 2008, 0 otherwise. 
WY2008 is the product of neighbors’ EDI spending and 𝐷2008. If the coefficient in front 
of this interaction term, γ, is positive and significant, it indicates that states compete 
against each other more fiercely in EDI spending after 2008. The reported coefficient 
estimates in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 (under contiguity and Euclidean weighting matrices 
respectively), however, fail to suggest more intense competition after year 2008 for the 
sample states.  
It is possible that competition did get more intense after the crisis but with a lag. 
To test this possibility, [4] is modified as follows. 
[5] 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 +γ′ 𝐷2009 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 𝛽 +  𝐷2009 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
                                                          
42





 𝐷2009  is a dummy variable that assigns years starting 2009 as 1, 0 otherwise. The 
second term on RHS is the product of neighbors’ EDI spending and  𝐷2009 . Again, 
results reported in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 are very similar to those in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 (γ’ 
insignificant). The estimates do not point to more intense competition after the 2008 
financial crisis. Although not reported in the main results table, coefficients for year 
dummies between 2009 and 2010 are negative and significant. This seem to indicate 
states do not have enough to spend on EDI, which might be why we did not find more 
intense competition after the financial crisis. The possibility that more or less intense 
competition after the 2008 financial crisis cannot be ruled out completely, but I did not 
find any evidence using the above data and sample. 
Another question that can be addressed is: Is EDI competition affected by 
political cycle? The nature of strategic interaction is very hard to pin down as different 
sources of competition (such as tax competition and yardstick competition) have similar 
effects.
43
 This paper does not claim to disentangle the two, but rather makes a very first 
attempt to see if political cycle plays a role in states’ EDI spending decision. Following 
Ermini and Santolini (2010), the following changes have been made to the baseline 
model to see if state governor election cycle drives incentives competition, where 
Delection is a dummy variable assigns governor election years related to change in 
governor as 1 and 0 otherwise.
44
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 Tax competition arises from jurisdictions compete over a mobile recourse (Wilson, 1999; Rork, 2003). 
Yardstick competition arises when voters have imperfect information and thus evaluate incumbents by 
using other jurisdictions’ actions as benchmark. Hence, yardstick competition produces copycat behavior, 
which is indistinguishable from tax mimicking (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). But for yardstick 
competition, this mimicking behavior is more apparent in election years (Besley and Case, 1995; Olle, 
2003, Bordignon et al., 2003). 
44
 Mimicking behavior is expected to be less pronounced if politicians cannot run for re-election, possibly 
due to term limits or retiring, so those years are also assigned to be 0 for Delection. 
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[6] 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝛿𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
The variable ‘election’ is the interaction of neighbors’ incentives spending and 
governor election year dummy (𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛). We would expect the coefficient on ‘election’ 
to be positive and significant if election cycle plays a part in EDI competition. Results 
are reported in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 δ remains statistically insignificant and negative 
mostly, rejecting yardstick competition as an explanation. The coefficient estimates of 
 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 are positive although not distinguishable from 0 in most cases, meaning states 
spend more on incentives in governor election years. Concerned that policymakers may 
respond to neighbors’ policy in the year that precedes election, Tables 3.12 and 3.13 
presents estimates of the model similar to [5] but with lagged governor election 
interacting with neighbor’s EDI spending (l_election). Still, no significant relationship 
has been found (δ’ remains statistically insignificant). This may change if more states 
and years are covered in the sample. Future research is needed to explore this question 
with better data coverage. 
3.7 Conclusion 
As the popularity of EDI grows, better understanding of EDI and related 
spending decisions is warranted. Most existing empirical studies, nevertheless, do not 
take strategic interaction into account when modelling EDI use. This paper examines 
whether EDI spending decisions in U.S. and the evidence shows that states exhibit some 
degree of interdependence in EDI spending decisions. That is, states react to neighbor’s 
increases in EDI spending by increasing their own EDI expenditures. This result is 
robust to numerous neighbor definitions. 
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Isolating the source of strategic interaction is very hard: two underlying 
theoretical frameworks produce equivalent reduced form models for empirical 
estimation. However, this analysis suggests that the competition for mobile businesses 
(which supposedly brings investment and jobs) is a more likely driver of EDI 
competition among states, given that I fail to find statistically significant influence of 
election cycles. This paper also tests if states compete more fiercely against each other 
after the most recent financial crisis. No such evidence has been found. EDI spending in 
US states is influenced by neighbors’ spending, but competition is not the sole impetus. 
EDI spending has also been found to be correlated with states’ own economic 
characteristics such as unemployment rate, manufacturing share of employment.  
The use of state-level data in a spatial econometric framework is a contribution 
of this study. Greater understanding of EDI spending at the state level provides insights 
for policymakers and adds to the heated discussion about incentives use. Utilizing 
Subsidy Tracker database and panel data across states provide more generalizable 
compared with studies that focus on a single geographic area or a specific type of 
incentives. This paper leaves several questions unanswered: how does strategic 
interaction of specific types of EDI differ from each other? Does the EDI spending on 
big projects cause yardstick competition among states? Will states’ response be 
different for decreases in neighbor’s EDI spending from increases? Future research with 
more detailed data and sample coverage is needed to address these questions and 




Figure 3.1: Sample Coverage of States 
 
 
Table 3.1: List of Sample States (count = 22) 
 
1 Connecticut 12 Minnesota 
2 Delaware 13 Missouri 
3 Florida 14 New Jersey 
4 Georgia 15 New York 
5 Illinois 16 North Carolina 
6 Indiana 17 North Dakota 
7 Iowa 18 Ohio 
8 Kentucky 19 Texas 
9 Louisiana 20 Vermont 
10 Maryland 21 Virginia 






Table 3.2: Variable Names and Data Sources 
Variables Description Data Sources 
incentives Per capita EDI spending ($) Subsidy Tracker (GJF) 
grants Per capita federal grants ($)  U.S. Census 
l_income Per capita personal income ($) Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
l_jobless rate  Unemployment rate (%) Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
l_above 65  Percentage of elder population (%)  U.S. Census 
l_corruption Convictions per 1,000,000 residents U.S. Department of Justice 
l_manufacturing  Manufacturing share of employment ($)  U.S. Census 
l_infrastructure Infrastructure spending (%)  U.S. Census 
l_tax revenue Per capita state tax revenue ($)  U.S. Census 
l_sales tax rate  State general sales tax rate (%) Tax Foundation 
l_corporate_rate Top statutory corporate income tax rate (%) Tax Foundation 
l_personal_rate Top statutory personal income tax rate (%) Tax Policy Center 





Table 3.3: Summary Statistics (n=264) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
incentives 18.767 38.707 0.004 351.874 
grants 715.4 254.6 250.0 1585.9 
l_income 18044.8 2636.7 13480.1 26945.9 
l_jobless rate  5.3492 1.9744 2.2 13.3 
l_above 65  12.87 1.55 9.55 18.14 
l_corruption 3.70 2.74 0.00 25.05 
l_manufacturing  12.92 4.67 4.10 24.70 
l_infrastructure 14.98 2.23 9.96 20.92 
l_tax revenue 48.11 5.63 33.32 66.88 
l_sales tax rate  5.07 1.40 0 7 
l_corporate_rate 6.34 3.37 0 12 
l_personal_rate 5.16 3.00 0 12 
Notes:  
(1) All dollar figures have been converted to real values, deflated by CPI (1982-84=100). 
(2) All dollar values are on a per capita basis. 









Table 3.4: Basic Results (Contiguity Ws) 
 
Note that ‘Inverse_dist’ stands for inverse geographic distance while ‘MedianHH’ refers to median household income. Same as below. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Ws Binary Inverse_dist Pop Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.568*** 0.810** 0.374** 0.746** 0.559*** 0.564*** 0.567*** 0.561*** 0.569*** 0.575***
 (0.182) (0.341) (0.153) (0.344) (0.180) (0.179) (0.179) (0.181) (0.181) (0.176)
Grants 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041***
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
l_income 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
l_jobless rate 5.940** 5.138* 6.368** 5.333* 5.962** 5.598** 5.981** 5.955** 5.913** 5.894**
 (2.755) (2.932) (2.797) (2.938) (2.767) (2.807) (2.744) (2.732) (2.752) (2.736)
l_above 65 -21.177** -19.040* -19.139* -19.101* -20.656** -20.128** -21.580** -21.947** -21.252** -21.845**
 (9.584) (9.728) (9.707) (9.756) (9.608) (9.660) (9.572) (9.541) (9.572) (9.543)
l_corruption 0.990 1.580 1.233 1.699 0.988 1.021 0.965 0.999 0.984 0.986
 (1.169) (1.170) (1.183) (1.171) (1.174) (1.180) (1.166) (1.159) (1.167) (1.160)
l_manufacture 6.142** 5.693* 6.815** 5.785* 6.306** 6.199** 5.892** 6.080** 6.090** 6.035**
 (2.849) (3.008) (2.879) (3.029) (2.852) (2.878) (2.857) (2.831) (2.847) (2.832)
l_infrastructure 4.005 3.554 2.959 3.460 4.042 4.128 4.012 4.177 4.134 4.534
 (3.372) (3.464) (3.492) (3.482) (3.387) (3.411) (3.362) (3.341) (3.365) (3.345)
l_tax revenue 0.026 -0.060 0.206 -0.069 0.022 0.029 0.063 -0.003 0.035 0.000
 (1.141) (1.170) (1.159) (1.175) (1.146) (1.154) (1.136) (1.132) (1.139) (1.133)
l_sales tax rate 202.545 141.699 120.823 169.442 232.042 156.687 137.238 228.513 202.304 265.545
 (890.985) (914.256) (912.861) (915.811) (894.464) (903.001) (890.148) (882.785) (889.666) (883.644)
l_corporate_ rate -61.938 -33.781 -77.230 -42.260 -54.471 -36.487 -73.887 -65.749 -61.472 -58.415
 (101.656) (104.849) (103.559) (104.725) (102.216) (103.410) (101.338) (100.759) (101.512) (101.007)
l_personal_rate -390.661** -522.222*** -429.377** -540.989*** -395.429** -383.243** -394.654** -388.812** -391.872** -389.684**
 (177.116) (179.509) (179.244) (181.240) (177.712) (179.581) (176.365) (175.758) (176.771) (175.830)
Ajusted R Square 0.351 0.324 0.327 0.321 0.345 0.335 0.355 0.363 0.353 0.360










[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Euclidean Ws Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu Falsification
Neighbor's EDI 0.594* 0.626* 0.613* 0.644* 0.791** 0.684* 0.639* -0.193
 (0.309) (0.342) (0.360) (0.361) (0.311) (0.398) (0.367) (0.152)
Grants 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.048***
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
l_income 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.001
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
l_jobless rate 6.198** 5.713** 5.909** 5.481* 5.213* 5.642* 5.601* 7.946***
 (2.831) (2.891) (2.904) (3.045) (2.926) (2.987) (2.963) (2.758)
l_above 65 -18.925* -18.412* -18.724* -16.588* -20.153** -17.640* -19.203* -14.383
 (9.700) (9.605) (9.725) (9.964) (9.850) (9.814) (9.779) (9.790)
l_corruption 1.554 1.606 1.688 1.749 1.870 1.687 1.700 2.121*
 (1.167) (1.156) (1.167) (1.200) (1.180) (1.182) (1.170) (1.189)
l_manufacture 6.164** 5.705* 5.890* 5.097 5.368* 6.483** 6.065** 8.156***
 (2.992) (3.081) (3.102) (3.348) (3.052) (3.012) (3.060) (2.799)
l_infrastructure 3.491 3.561 3.555 3.374 3.855 3.508 3.265 5.482
 (3.469) (3.441) (3.483) (3.593) (3.479) (3.532) (3.522) (3.459)
l_tax revenue 0.200 0.000 0.233 0.414 -0.138 0.216 0.081 0.294
 (1.158) (1.158) (1.160) (1.195) (1.183) (1.176) (1.169) (1.143)
l_sales tax rate 157.349 107.506 175.078 82.953 180.961 193.586 194.296 233.666
 (913.239) (911.886) (916.613) (949.910) (919.447) (926.637) (917.018) (903.548)
l_corporate_ rate -28.225 -37.484 -58.589 -31.482 -30.574 -69.951 -45.497 -51.133
 (105.567) (104.024) (103.813) (108.685) (105.777) (104.972) (104.817) (103.097)
l_personal_rate -513.632*** -532.987*** -524.578*** -548.227*** -521.028*** -546.176*** -530.586*** -425.424**
 (178.785) (178.968) (180.375) (187.540) (180.881) (184.938) (181.313) (180.474)
Ajusted R Square 0.329 0.340 0.326 0.287 0.312 0.308 0.322 0.346











 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Ws Binary Inverse_dist Pop Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.651*** 0.839*** 0.435** 1.222* 0.651*** 0.438** 0.660*** 0.641*** 0.658*** 0.653***
 (0.230) (0.318) (0.195) (0.656) (0.238) (0.217) (0.225) (0.217) (0.229) (0.218)
γ 0.240 0.933 0.458 -0.802 0.222 0.528 0.096 0.281 0.214 0.205
(0.553) (0.659) (0.602) (1.774) (0.554) (0.462) (0.543) (0.548) (0.548) (0.507)
Grants 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036***
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
l_income 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 0.994 0.111 1.364 1.162 1.018 0.794 1.166 0.919 0.980 0.886
 (1.820) (1.857) (1.812) (1.855) (1.837) (1.811) (1.808) (1.805) (1.819) (1.814)
l_above 65 2.277 0.814 2.150 1.830 2.275 1.479 2.808* 2.133 2.370 2.394
 (1.581) (1.500) (1.589) (1.717) (1.604) (1.540) (1.611) (1.546) (1.586) (1.572)
l_corruption 0.477 0.858 0.554 1.176 0.501 0.643 0.522 0.456 0.487 0.539
 (0.903) (0.883) (0.905) (0.913) (0.909) (0.889) (0.902) (0.896) (0.902) (0.895)
l_manufacture 1.548** 1.678** 1.680** 2.144** 1.544** 1.597** 1.567** 1.564** 1.571** 1.582**
 (0.688) (0.675) (0.688) (0.844) (0.693) (0.678) (0.687) (0.681) (0.687) (0.683)
l_infrastructure 1.787 1.212 1.985 2.305 1.875 1.913 1.622 1.697 1.742 1.644
 (1.473) (1.495) (1.503) (1.528) (1.480) (1.429) (1.472) (1.463) (1.469) (1.452)
l_tax revenue -0.276 -0.882 -0.183 -0.613 -0.255 -0.251 -0.218 -0.309 -0.266 -0.295
 (0.821) (0.848) (0.826) (0.881) (0.828) (0.808) (0.817) (0.814) (0.821) (0.817)
l_sales tax rate -228.092 -76.909 -215.634 -335.771 -234.371 -182.260 -257.293 -214.727 -233.842 -228.046
 (210.288) (211.049) (218.898) (291.402) (212.727) (202.412) (210.250) (207.522) (210.095) (208.929)
l_corporate_ rate 52.911 88.385 50.276 97.838 60.901 90.102 38.614 47.199 51.739 55.023
 (78.970) (76.345) (79.458) (80.783) (79.445) (77.712) (79.537) (78.323) (79.056) (78.669)
l_personal_rate -125.103 -105.015 -94.365 -203.365 -132.169 -119.179 -138.540 -119.269 -131.792 -140.002
 (93.864) (94.803) (95.652) (133.911) (93.985) (89.223) (95.751) (93.392) (93.977) (92.937)











[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Euclidean Ws Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.815** 0.643* 0.907** 0.680 0.787** 0.846* 0.395
 (0.411) (0.376) (0.386) (0.433) (0.384) (0.498) (0.401)
γ -0.140 0.168 -0.451 0.521 -0.243 0.014 0.839
(0.896) (0.889) (1.072) (0.974) (0.898) (1.068) (0.680)
Grants 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.052***
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
l_income 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 1.958 1.971 1.784 1.959 1.641 1.526 1.909
 (1.784) (1.759) (1.804) (1.857) (1.832) (1.861) (1.819)
l_above 65 1.438 1.507 1.785 1.539 1.529 1.761 1.443
 (1.531) (1.520) (1.581) (1.579) (1.572) (1.569) (1.536)
l_corruption 1.182 1.088 1.118 1.108 1.273 1.121 1.085
 (0.901) (0.885) (0.904) (0.932) (0.911) (0.912) (0.899)
l_manufacture 1.947*** 1.780** 2.018*** 1.366* 1.898*** 1.910*** 1.682**
 (0.739) (0.713) (0.751) (0.755) (0.710) (0.734) (0.715)
l_infrastructure 2.005 2.013 2.336 1.712 2.460* 2.185 1.921
 (1.467) (1.449) (1.475) (1.600) (1.461) (1.488) (1.454)
l_tax revenue -0.332 -0.245 -0.237 0.200 -0.314 -0.078 -0.058
 (0.845) (0.831) (0.837) (0.832) (0.858) (0.843) (0.842)
l_sales tax rate -290.226 -237.571 -313.039 -252.451 -275.273 -275.565 -168.790
 (221.640) (218.835) (235.792) (235.953) (232.517) (225.231) (208.713)
l_corporate_ rate 113.122 97.750 89.597 132.812 101.474 83.140 89.115
 (80.386) (79.247) (79.836) (85.106) (79.987) (80.791) (79.441)
l_personal_rate -153.775 -138.233 -166.003 -136.240 -162.380 -139.956 -85.141
 (106.805) (106.294) (105.734) (106.542) (103.877) (104.462) (99.850)











 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Ws Binary Inverse_dist Pop Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.609** 0.956*** 0.360* 1.080*** 0.615*** 0.446** 0.597** 0.602*** 0.625*** 0.620***
 (0.237) (0.290) (0.186) (0.385) (0.234) (0.200) (0.243) (0.229) (0.233) (0.220)
γ' 0.468 0.699 0.963 -0.573 0.462 0.778 0.380 0.478 0.411 0.428
(0.713) (0.694) (0.640) (1.215) (0.716) (0.630) (0.719) (0.697) (0.711) (0.688)
Grants 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
l_income 0.002 0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 1.110 0.580 1.471 1.250 1.125 1.080 1.199 1.054 1.086 0.995
 (1.731) (1.746) (1.688) (1.839) (1.744) (1.684) (1.725) (1.720) (1.738) (1.728)
l_above 65 2.297 1.272 2.184 1.516 2.294 1.695 2.692* 2.183 2.394 2.415
 (1.478) (1.402) (1.448) (1.527) (1.489) (1.409) (1.518) (1.455) (1.486) (1.472)
l_corruption 0.389 0.836 0.388 1.199 0.397 0.401 0.449 0.379 0.405 0.439
 (0.888) (0.885) (0.870) (0.913) (0.896) (0.858) (0.885) (0.881) (0.891) (0.884)
l_manufacture 1.440** 1.598** 1.449** 2.104*** 1.430** 1.396** 1.478** 1.460** 1.476** 1.479**
 (0.692) (0.691) (0.677) (0.789) (0.700) (0.665) (0.689) (0.687) (0.694) (0.688)
l_infrastructure 1.597 1.388 1.487 2.173 1.664 1.649 1.420 1.542 1.580 1.463
 (1.478) (1.485) (1.463) (1.458) (1.494) (1.418) (1.465) (1.462) (1.479) (1.462)
l_tax revenue -0.292 -0.787 -0.259 -0.506 -0.277 -0.237 -0.259 -0.316 -0.281 -0.316
 (0.790) (0.821) (0.776) (0.856) (0.796) (0.761) (0.788) (0.785) (0.793) (0.788)
l_sales tax rate -210.228 -132.502 -158.165 -289.774 -216.571 -187.971 -224.519 -200.763 -219.261 -210.515
 (203.904) (198.672) (204.546) (225.290) (204.705) (189.366) (206.849) (202.048) (204.192) (203.161)
l_corporate_ rate 39.711 69.520 23.324 100.640 45.987 59.380 30.635 34.984 39.848 41.740
 (78.396) (78.115) (77.487) (81.019) (79.331) (75.266) (78.091) (77.655) (78.708) (78.053)
l_personal_rate -87.073 -83.432 -16.578 -205.209 -92.997 -58.136 -100.952 -83.352 -98.315 -102.770
 (116.184) (112.659) (109.452) (133.679) (116.994) (105.497) (119.477) (114.377) (116.898) (116.303)











[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Euclidean Ws Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.790** 0.705* 0.833** 0.773** 0.733** 0.848** 0.513
 (0.305) (0.381) (0.324) (0.344) (0.318) (0.427) (0.348)
γ' -0.097 -0.060 -0.208 0.350 -0.089 0.009 0.851
(0.631) (1.092) (0.922) (0.756) (0.829) (0.878) (0.702)
Grants 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.051***
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
l_income 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 1.976 1.990 1.802 2.050 1.636 1.526 1.714
 (1.781) (1.772) (1.801) (1.841) (1.833) (1.864) (1.811)
l_above 65 1.385 1.579 1.603 1.692 1.417 1.766 1.808
 (1.506) (1.481) (1.506) (1.554) (1.508) (1.523) (1.498)
l_corruption 1.183 1.110 1.108 1.115 1.311 1.121 1.068
 (0.901) (0.896) (0.901) (0.930) (0.901) (0.912) (0.898)
l_manufacture 1.945*** 1.841** 1.958*** 1.415* 1.881** 1.911*** 1.626**
 (0.734) (0.774) (0.743) (0.740) (0.729) (0.728) (0.727)
l_infrastructure 1.985 2.097 2.228 1.929 2.400* 2.188 1.934
 (1.446) (1.461) (1.440) (1.499) (1.446) (1.451) (1.449)
l_tax revenue -0.313 -0.241 -0.210 0.182 -0.301 -0.079 -0.189
 (0.839) (0.840) (0.839) (0.832) (0.864) (0.837) (0.836)
l_sales tax rate -282.647 -263.101 -277.051 -291.532 -250.015 -276.274 -190.785
 (203.503) (217.805) (213.111) (210.028) (211.109) (208.062) (202.877)
l_corporate_ rate 112.482 101.118 89.376 133.889 101.008 83.088 86.491
 (79.960) (79.640) (79.663) (84.916) (80.524) (80.691) (79.237)
l_personal_rate -153.252 -154.379 -158.439 -134.352 -155.888 -139.854 -66.317
 (105.375) (128.273) (113.225) (112.326) (112.613) (114.293) (107.655)






Table 3.10: Extensions 2.1 (Contiguity Ws) 
   
 
 
` [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Ws Binary Inverse_dist Pop Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.724*** 1.185*** 0.537*** 1.461 0.734*** 0.581*** 0.691*** 0.711*** 0.725*** 0.705***
 (0.208) (0.417) (0.178) (2.164) (0.207) (0.194) (0.202) (0.204) (0.204) (0.196)
Grants 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037***
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
l_income 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 1.112 0.167 1.552 0.939 1.052 1.358 1.223 1.091 1.089 1.092
 (1.877) (2.081) (1.912) (1.899) (1.894) (1.919) (1.829) (1.876) (1.870) (1.862)
l_above 65 2.483 0.847 2.481 1.342 2.392 2.255 2.922* 2.387 2.560 2.693*
 (1.610) (1.705) (1.631) (1.532) (1.622) (1.611) (1.617) (1.593) (1.613) (1.621)
l_corruption 0.503 1.346 0.615 0.957 0.544 0.468 0.528 0.484 0.507 0.509
 (0.940) (0.956) (0.944) (1.417) (0.942) (0.982) (0.926) (0.936) (0.940) (0.942)
l_manufacture 1.580** 2.030*** 1.758** 1.741 1.605** 1.510** 1.573** 1.595** 1.601** 1.569**
 (0.726) (0.741) (0.736) (1.176) (0.731) (0.746) (0.715) (0.720) (0.725) (0.722)
l_infrastructure 1.957 2.124 2.426* 2.079 2.040 2.263 1.674 1.901 1.883 1.755
 (1.432) (1.438) (1.461) (1.498) (1.436) (1.432) (1.438) (1.422) (1.433) (1.433)
l_tax revenue -0.227 -1.082 -0.091 -0.584 -0.271 0.131 -0.188 -0.223 -0.220 -0.166
 (0.917) (1.099) (0.906) (0.942) (0.923) (0.979) (0.879) (0.924) (0.915) (0.921)
l_sales tax rate -268.227 -181.825 -289.047 -160.741 -270.170 -266.038 -274.993 -260.352 -270.964 -267.265
 (196.414) (200.183) (203.216) (321.110) (197.591) (197.106) (195.246) (194.865) (196.142) (195.572)
l_corporate_ rate 49.707 93.070 48.031 113.559 56.006 87.049 37.241 45.045 48.502 52.838
 (80.595) (79.990) (82.578) (106.275) (80.679) (81.524) (80.351) (80.367) (80.476) (80.045)
l_personal_rate -138.158 -164.800* -120.400 -159.593* -142.950 -140.088 -144.785 -135.680 -143.495 -151.369*
 (89.738) (91.254) (92.437) (92.705) (90.223) (90.178) (89.490) (89.014) (89.708) (89.591)
δ -0.129 -0.828 -0.129 -2.083 -0.314 0.541 -0.024 -0.043 -0.128 0.119
 (1.237) (1.373) (0.958) (9.004) (1.237) (1.560) (1.098) (1.261) (1.250) (1.299)
election year 2.808 8.354 1.632 34.392 5.468 -6.404 0.969 1.456 2.925 -0.535
 (18.627) (20.022) (15.648) (168.551) (18.621) (21.896) (17.626) (18.789) (18.776) (19.386)










[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Euclidean Ws Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.583 1.667* 1.346 -0.081 1.208 1.036 1.176
 (0.636) (0.937) (1.013) (0.648) (0.746) (1.228) (0.904)
Grants 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.051***
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
l_income 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003*
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 1.654 1.656 1.390 1.257 1.134 1.214 1.101
 (1.827) (1.936) (1.880) (2.107) (1.896) (1.927) (2.022)
l_above 65 1.177 1.935 1.593 2.322 1.402 1.608 1.752
 (1.544) (1.666) (1.546) (1.796) (1.547) (1.557) (1.533)
l_corruption 1.365 0.786 0.822 1.661 1.061 1.083 0.915
 (1.020) (1.012) (1.067) (1.082) (1.015) (1.053) (1.052)
l_manufacture 2.040*** 1.513* 1.792** 1.973** 1.681** 1.903** 1.761**
 (0.766) (0.800) (0.741) (0.871) (0.765) (0.751) (0.785)
l_infrastructure 2.162 1.772 2.117 1.550 2.530* 2.306 2.255
 (1.487) (1.575) (1.477) (1.692) (1.446) (1.472) (1.466)
l_tax revenue -0.542 -0.311 -0.317 -0.298 -0.453 -0.265 -0.511
 (0.891) (0.923) (0.865) (0.970) (0.892) (0.892) (0.943)
l_sales tax rate -270.751 -130.276 -193.407 -378.977 -132.670 -241.864 -166.542
 (205.165) (232.543) (217.029) (233.003) (236.829) (224.979) (242.387)
l_corporate_ rate 111.210 105.808 103.584 82.767 110.592 90.203 94.397
 (80.250) (85.069) (84.850) (99.911) (81.894) (93.104) (81.258)
l_personal_rate -149.751* -131.820 -145.321 -152.082 -138.481 -144.032 -142.520
 (90.851) (98.545) (91.790) (105.630) (94.414) (91.468) (91.713)
δ 0.785 -3.689 -2.242 3.466* -1.458 -0.589 -1.416
 (2.376) (3.381) (4.010) (2.031) (2.200) (4.192) (2.783)
election year -20.919 66.076 38.224 -70.634* 24.022 6.300 22.570
 (48.915) (64.681) (75.804) (39.391) (44.527) (78.376) (54.580)










` [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Ws Binary Inverse_dist Pop Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.717*** 0.995*** 0.539*** 0.999*** 0.713*** 0.596*** 0.696*** 0.708*** 0.713*** 0.707***
 (0.196) (0.313) (0.170) (0.296) (0.197) (0.182) (0.189) (0.191) (0.193) (0.184)
Grants 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
l_income 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 0.962 0.851 1.407 1.261 0.973 1.051 1.064 0.905 0.954 0.904
 (1.813) (1.855) (1.850) (1.818) (1.826) (1.811) (1.789) (1.804) (1.809) (1.795)
l_above 65 2.099 1.331 2.269 1.345 2.113 1.783 2.352 2.017 2.149 2.139
 (1.503) (1.515) (1.552) (1.518) (1.513) (1.486) (1.501) (1.489) (1.502) (1.492)
l_corruption 0.558 1.109 0.627 1.110 0.558 0.664 0.611 0.535 0.566 0.611
 (0.906) (0.902) (0.933) (0.905) (0.912) (0.899) (0.896) (0.899) (0.904) (0.895)
l_manufacture 1.640** 1.859*** 1.792** 1.825** 1.631** 1.660** 1.658** 1.661** 1.658** 1.661**
 (0.689) (0.690) (0.708) (0.706) (0.694) (0.685) (0.683) (0.683) (0.687) (0.682)
l_infrastructure 1.911 2.026 2.335 1.944 1.976 2.229 1.694 1.830 1.852 1.757
 (1.417) (1.423) (1.450) (1.438) (1.424) (1.402) (1.413) (1.409) (1.416) (1.408)
l_tax revenue -0.466 -0.640 -0.280 -0.506 -0.445 -0.276 -0.470 -0.485 -0.454 -0.465
 (0.835) (0.867) (0.853) (0.850) (0.840) (0.820) (0.826) (0.830) (0.831) (0.823)
l_sales tax rate -264.337 -212.883 -295.612 -225.313 -268.075 -264.760 -268.770 -258.860 -265.795 -255.224
 (193.692) (195.529) (199.625) (197.425) (194.978) (192.609) (191.976) (192.173) (193.284) (191.999)
l_corporate_ rate 53.985 98.040 55.533 102.426 60.809 82.865 42.645 48.723 52.879 54.356
 (79.806) (79.330) (82.329) (79.923) (80.100) (78.614) (79.610) (79.388) (79.673) (79.022)
l_personal_rate -141.864 -161.583* -130.026 -155.473* -146.668 -141.835 -145.231 -141.592 -145.986 -151.079*
 (89.335) (90.301) (91.968) (91.524) (89.992) (88.851) (88.604) (88.627) (89.199) (88.660)
δ' -0.633* -0.105 -0.476 -0.485 -0.610 -0.529 -0.612* -0.628 -0.623* -0.615*
 (0.376) (0.322) (0.359) (0.729) (0.380) (0.369) (0.325) (0.388) (0.369) (0.354)
election year 5.693 -1.071 3.483 4.920 5.365 4.022 5.461 5.534 5.566 5.485
 (7.552) (6.966) (7.451) (13.242) (7.625) (7.377) (7.201) (7.549) (7.479) (7.328)










[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Euclidean Ws Income MedianHH Corruption Manufacture Infrastructure Edu Higher edu 
Neighbor's EDI 0.800*** 0.710** 0.837*** 0.858** 0.751** 0.947** 0.711**
 (0.299) (0.311) (0.320) (0.346) (0.327) (0.378) (0.349)
Grants 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050***
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
l_income 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l_jobless rate 2.035 2.098 1.822 2.357 1.691 1.545 1.795
 (1.774) (1.766) (1.791) (1.818) (1.819) (1.860) (1.814)
l_above 65 1.267 1.508 1.460 1.487 1.264 1.620 1.784
 (1.513) (1.481) (1.508) (1.545) (1.519) (1.532) (1.507)
l_corruption 1.105 1.057 1.013 1.269 1.246 1.085 1.099
 (0.900) (0.888) (0.901) (0.934) (0.904) (0.919) (0.902)
l_manufacture 1.777** 1.735** 1.809*** 1.404* 1.750** 1.807** 1.857***
 (0.704) (0.692) (0.696) (0.735) (0.701) (0.708) (0.702)
l_infrastructure 1.798 1.972 2.043 2.056 2.259 1.987 2.204
 (1.449) (1.420) (1.431) (1.472) (1.423) (1.463) (1.435)
l_tax revenue -0.281 -0.232 -0.252 0.325 -0.276 -0.085 -0.144
 (0.836) (0.833) (0.833) (0.829) (0.852) (0.839) (0.838)
l_sales tax rate -264.100 -248.965 -245.979 -282.612 -228.302 -255.888 -252.936
 (195.198) (192.885) (195.863) (201.274) (196.556) (199.756) (196.606)
l_corporate_ rate 117.408 105.494 96.220 143.595* 109.511 91.190 93.352
 (79.803) (78.422) (79.549) (83.924) (80.011) (81.181) (79.713)
l_personal_rate -141.106 -147.251 -141.212 -142.276 -144.833 -134.302 -137.820
 (90.398) (89.462) (90.523) (93.302) (90.735) (92.299) (90.662)
δ' -0.430 -0.409 -0.468 -0.904* -0.510 -0.826 -0.224
 (0.562) (0.690) (0.671) (0.490) (0.665) (0.763) (0.737)
election year 4.168 3.188 3.950 11.414 5.424 10.379 1.115
 (11.270) (12.405) (12.715) (10.155) (12.786) (14.051) (13.158)




Chapter 4: Economic Development Incentives and Income Inequality: 
Preliminary Analysis of US States 
4.1 Introduction 
This paper explores the relationship between the practice of offering economic 
development incentives (EDIs) and income inequality in U.S. states. Government policy 
makers use EDIs to influence business decisions so as to create a positive net benefit for 
the jurisdiction. Benefits can be direct and induced in the form of jobs, income, and 
state revenues. EDIs come in many forms, including grants, tax exemptions, tax refunds, 
tax credits, infrastructure investments, and even cash. No matter the type, EDIs lower a 
firm’s cost of conducting business in a particular location. In so doing, EDIs redistribute 
public funds to private firms.   
There is an increasing awareness by the popular press, watch dog organizations, 
and policy think tanks about the profligate use of EDI deals. Skepticism about the 
efficacy of EDI programs is supported by the academic literature which offers 
conflicting conclusions regarding EDI impacts on economic outcomes. The cost-benefit 
assessment is complex. It is difficult to pin down how much of an incentive is needed to 
close the gap between competing jurisdictions: communities lack information about the 
targeted firm’s expected tax revenue and budget impacts, as well as the value of 
competitor’s bids (which are not disclosed).  
Firms have been successful in negotiating increasingly large EDI deals, often by 
initiating competitive bidding among jurisdictions. The more valuable the firm in terms 
of expected economic benefits, the more the competition, and the bigger the incentive 
 
93 
needed to close the gap between competitors (Ellis and Rogers 2000). In the aggregate, 
state and local governments spend billions of dollars on EDIs. Large corporations have 
been successful at negotiating multi-million and even billion dollar deals. It is estimated 
that at least 75 percent of cumulative disclosed EDI dollars have gone to just 965 large 
corporations, even though these companies account for only about 10 percent of the 
number of announced awards.
45
According to another report from Good Jobs First (GJF), 
99 firms have been awarded more than $19 billion in cumulative subsidies.
46
 In fact, the 
GJF report argues that EDI awards to large corporations contribute to the increasing 
income inequality in the US. Notably, as they point out, many of the incentivized 
companies are well-known low-wage employers. The distributional impacts, however, 
are complex. For example low wage jobs may provide opportunities for unemployed 
workers, thereby increasing overall employment while adding more low wage earners to 
the income distribution. Furthermore, some high wage employers receive EDI as well 
EDI have two potential impacts on the income distribution, beyond changing the 
mix of employers. First is the immediate impact of redistributing large amounts of 
public funds to private entities receiving the EDI. Second, EDI divert funds from other 
possible uses, including offering EDIs to other businesses, spending on public goods, 
and keeping tax rates low. Wang (2015) finds a negative relationship between EDI 
spending and investment in some public goods categories. To the extent that other 
spending leads to income enhancement opportunities, EDIs could negatively influence 
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 Subsidizing the Corporate One Percent: Subsidy Tracker 2.0 Reveals Big-Business Dominance of State 
and Local Development Incentives, by Philip Mattera (February 2014): 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/subsidizingthecorporateonepercent.pdf. 
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income equality, especially given that the largest corporations receive the biggest EDIs 
due to the intensity of the EDI competition.  
Third, this research investigates the use of EDIs at the state level to identify the 
extent to which the use of EDIs is related with income inequality. The empirical 
analysis uses state level data on incentives and measures of income inequality. This 
preliminary investigation considers the relationship between subsidy values across 
states and inequality using the Subsidy Tracker data following Wang (2015) and income 
inequality using several common inequality measures following (Frank, 2009). The 
initial empirical specification builds on Wang (2015) using panel data methods. The 
results estimate the extent to which the practice of offering EDI is related to income 
inequality US states. 
4.2 Relevant Literature 
The literature on the efficacy of EDIs is both large and inconclusive. Please refer 
to Peters and Fisher (2004), Patrick (2012), and Wang (2014) for overviews. Rising 
income inequality over the past thirty years has been well documented in the literature 
(Williams, 2014; Leight, 2010; Frank, 2009). The literature regarding the relationship 
between income inequality and growth both within US and across countries is extensive 
(Leight, 2010).  
Using data from 15 OECD countries during the period 2004 to 2012, Royuela et 
al (2014) find inequality is negatively associated with economic growth with the 
magnitude increases with city size. Frank (2009) mainly attributes the long term 
positive association between inequality (measured by top 10% income share) and 
growth at the state level to the concentration of income in the upper end of the income 
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distribution. Using a Gini coefficient as an inequality measure, Leight (2010) finds that 
inequality has a significant and negative impact on growth in the short run in U.S. states. 
Further, he find that politics, growth and inequality are interlinked: growth increases 
and inequality decreases under Democratic control, compared with the opposite effects 
under Republican control.  
In a related vein, Chintrakarn et al (2012) investigate the effect of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) on income inequality in the US during 1977-2001 using panel 
cointegration techniques. They find the effect to be negative in the long term. However, 
this relationship differs across states: almost half of the 48 states exhibit a positive 
correlation between FDI and inequality.  
Regarding the determinants of income inequality, Roine et al (2009) point out 
that increases in the top 1% income share which are associated with high growth comes 
at the expense of the rest of the top 10%. Further, government spending is found to 
increase the bottom 90% income share, decrease the income share of the upper middle 
class, while does not seem to affect the top percentile. Dincer and Gunalp (2012) 
emphasize the role of corruption and find that corruption is positively associated with 
income inequality in US states. 
In addition to the relationship between inequality and growth, a number of 
studies focus on the effect of inequality on crime in the US. Brush (2007) finds income 
inequality and crime rates are positively correlated using cross-section analysis whereas 
the relationship is negative under time-series analysis. Choe (2008) shows that income 
inequality has strong and robust effects on burglary and robbery crimes, but fails to find 
evidence relating inequality to other categories of crime. In contrast to prior research, 
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Chintrakarn and Herzer (2012) find that income inequality reduces crime, possibly due 
to increased protection against crimes. 
To summarize, the literature covers a host of related mechanisms by which 
government policy influences inequality. However, the link between EDI spending 
decisions and inequality impacts has not been investigated heretofore. The estimation 
that follows addresses this gap: are EDI expenditures related to inequality measures at 
the state level? 
4.3 Model Specification and Estimation 
4.3.1 Baseline Model 
Following Dincer and Gunalp (2012), a dynamic panel model is adopted to 
analyze the effect of EDIs on income inequality. The baseline estimation is as follows: 
[1] 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡  + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑖 + µ𝑡 + 𝜈 𝑖𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the income inequality measure in state 𝑖 year 𝑡. The 
parameter of interest, 𝛽, is the coefficient corresponding to EDI spending in state 𝑖 year 
𝑡. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of conditioning variables (including an intercept) that are thought to 
influence income inequality. State and year fixed effects (𝛿 
𝑖
 and µ𝑡) account for state 
level characteristics that do not change over time and macroeconomic shocks that affect 
all states at the same time.  
Inclusion the lagged dependent variable creates estimation challenges. To better 
see this, Equation [1] is written in a more generic form: 





+ µ𝑡 + 𝜈 𝑖𝑡for 𝑖 , …,  𝑡,…,T. 
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We can easily tell that lagged dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is correlated with 𝛿 𝑖 in 
the error term. This endogeneity causes OLS estimator to be biased and inconsistent. 
Further, this problem cannot be circumvented with 2SLS or panel fixed effects 
estimator (Roodman, 2009). The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is a standard way to address these concerns 
(Roine et al, 2009).  
4.3.2 GMM Estimator: Arellano and Bond (1991) 
The GMM estimator starts with first differencing the model to remove state 
fixed effects. The transformed model is estimated using lagged levels of the dependent 
variable and endogenous variables, as well as differences of exogenous variables as 







+ ∆  
𝑖𝑡
,  
















for t = 3, 4,…, T and s >= 2. 
First differencing, however, shrinks the data set and amplifies gaps in an 
unbalanced panel. If 𝑦 
𝑖𝑡
 
is missing, for example, then both ∆ 𝑦 
𝑖𝑡




missing in the first differenced transformed data. Alternative transformations, forward 
orthogonal deviations or orthogonal deviations, helps to mitigate the problem (Arellano 
and Bover 1995). In contrast to the first differencing transformation, which deducts 
observation from last period from the present one, the forward orthogonal deviation 
transformation subtracts the average of all future values from the present one (Roodman, 
2009). Thus, the forward orthogonal deviation transformation only discards the last 
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observation for each group, which minimizes data loss.
47
 I adopt the forward orthogonal 
deviation transformation as a robustness check. 
Lagged independent variables can be poor instruments when they do not change 
much over time, which is a potential problem with difference GMM estimator. This 
does not seem to be a problem for my estimation. Nevertheless, a third robustness 
estimates the baseline model through dynamic system GMM, developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). It helps to address the aforementioned problem with difference GMM 
by providing more moment conditions available from the level equation. Following 
Blundell and Bond (1998) the level equation [2] is incorporated in the first-differenced 
GMM. Variables in the level equation are instrumented with their own differences. 
4.3.3 Specification Tests for GMM Estimators: AR (1), AR (2) and Sargan/Hansen 
Tests 
The consistency of the difference GMM estimator depends critically on the 
validity of the moment conditions listed in [4] – [5] and the lack of second order serial 
correlation in the error terms. The Sargan/Hansen test is used to examine the validity of 
instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous as a group. As a 
result, a higher p-value of the Sargan/Hansen statistic is preferred. 
The other important diagnostic is the AR test for autocorrelation of the residuals. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator relies on the lack of second order serial 
correlation. By construction, the residuals of the first differenced equation should 
possess serial correlation. Accordingly, the null is always rejected for the AR (1) test. 
For instruments to be valid, differenced residuals should not show significant second 
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 Further, Hayakawa (2009) shows in a recent simulation study that the GMM estimator transformed by 
forward orthogonal deviation tends to perform better than the one transformed by first differencing. 
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order of serial correlation. Accordingly, a high reported p-value in AR (2) test indicates 
that the moment conditions are valid. If the AR (2) statistic is significant, longer lags 
need to be used. 
The other important diagnostic is the AR test for autocorrelation of the residuals. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator relies on the lack of second order serial 
correlation. By construction, the residuals of the first differenced equation should 
possess serial correlation. Accordingly, the null is always rejected for the AR (1) test. 
For instruments to be valid, differenced residuals should not show significant second 
order of serial correlation. Accordingly, a high reported p-value in AR (2) test indicates 
that the moment conditions are valid. If the AR (2) statistic is significant, longer lags 
need to be used. 
4.4 Data 
To measure income inequality, I rely on the measures constructed by Mark 
Frank who created measures for a panel of 50 states plus DC spanning 1917 to 2012 
using individual tax filing data available from the Internal Revenue Service
48
 Three 
inequality measures are employed in this paper: Top 1%, Top 10%, and Gini 
Coefficient. The first two measure the concentration of income at the top level whereas 
the Gini Coefficient summarizes the entire income distribution. 
The control variables largely follow the work of Dincer and Gunalp (2012). 
Economic variables include personal income, top statutory state corporate income tax 
rate, top statutory personal income tax rate, unemployment rate, manufacturing share of 
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 U.S. State-Level Income Inequality Data - Mark W. Frank:  
http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html. The IRS data report gross income that includes the 
following: wages and salaries, capital income (dividends, interest, rents, and royalties) and 
entrepreneurial income (self-employment, small businesses, and partnerships). 
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employment, government spending on welfare programs. Demographic characteristics 
include percentage of young population, percentage of old population, and years of 
education. Political variables include union membership, corruption, as well as 
bipartisanship at the state level. Table 4.1 provides variable descriptions and data 
sources. Government finance data (public welfare spending and unemployment 
compensation), manufacturing share of employment and demographic characteristics 
are obtained from US Census, while personal income and unemployment rates are from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Top statutory state corporate income tax rate 
and top statutory state personal income tax rate data are collected from Tax Foundation 
and Tax Policy Center respectively. The U.S. Department of Justice provides reports of 
federal public corruption convictions. Union membership data, measured by percentage 
of nonagricultural employees covered by a collective bargaining, are made available by 
Hirsch
49
 ‘Democratic control’ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if both the state 
governor and legislature belong to the Democratic Party based on data provided by the 
National Governor Association (NGA) and National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL).  
The sample data includes control variables and EDI data. All dollar figures are 
transformed to a per capita basis and deflated using CPI with 1982-1984 as the base 
year. Data availability restricts the sample to 43 states over the period 2000-2009. The 
dataset contains 340 observations. Examining the sample reveals that per capita EDI 
spending ranges over the time period from less than a dollar (Louisiana in 2004) to 
$558 (New Mexico in 2004) with an average of $17 across all states and years. The 
income share of the top percentile are highest in New Mexico in 2000 (32%) and lowest 
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 His webpage contains state union membership data from 1983 to 2014:  http://www.unionstats.com/. 
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in Connecticut in 2000 (15%) with an average of 19%. The manufacturing share of 
employment average is 12.10 percent, ranging from 4 to 24 percent. Corruption rate 
varies extensively with the average being 3.39 convictions per 1,000,000 residents. The 
highest occurred in North Dakota in 2003 (25 convictions) and the lowest was in 
Oregon in 2002 (0.28 convictions). The mean of union membership is 11.66% with 
New York in 2001 being the most unionized state (26.9%) and North Carolina in 2004 
being the least unionized (2.8%). Colorado in 2009 was the most educated state with 
14.44 years of education compared with an average of 13.6 years. Per capita 
expenditures on public welfare and unemployment compensation are small compared 
with other public expenditure categories. The averages are less than a dollar: New York 
in 2005 and New Jersey in 2009 spend the most on welfare and unemployment, $1.14 




Table 4.3 through 4.6 shows OLS, Fixed Effect (FE), Difference GMM, and 
System GMM estimation results respectively. For OLS and FE estimation, columns [1] 
to [3] display estimated coefficients for equation [1] without lagged dependent variable, 
with lagged dependent variable, and further with one year lag of EDI respectively.
51
  
The first column of Table 4.3 (OLS estimation) indicates that EDI spending and 
top 1% income shares are positively correlated. In addition, years of education, 
democratic control, manufacturing share of employment, top corporate and personal 
income tax rates are all negatively associated with top 1% income share. Further, the 
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 Top1, EDI, Public welfare_exp, Unemployment_exp, and Income are expressed in natural log forms. 
Income square is added to explore the nonlinear relationship between growth and inequality (Dincer and 
Gunalp, 2012; Kim, Huang and Lin, 2011; Ram, 1991). 
51
 One year lag of EDI is included to account for lagged effect of EDI on income inequality. 
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positive coefficient on the income variable and negative coefficient on income squared 
are consistent with Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis about the relationship between 
income inequality and growth, which states income inequality first worsens and then 
improves over the course of economic development. The estimated coefficients of one 
year lags of top percentile income share, shown in the last two columns, are highly 
statistically significant. In these specifications, only expenditures on unemployment 
compensation, unemployment rate, and percentage of population above 65 are 
statistically significant: they are negatively related to the income share of top percentile. 
For FE estimation in Table 4.4, we consistently confirm Kuznets’ hypothesis and see 
the negative relationship between union membership and top one percent income share. 
Difference GMM (Table 4.5) and System GMM (Table 4.6) results are similar 
in that both find evidence of EDI spending positively associated with the income share 
of top percentile, regardless of EDI spending is treated as exogenous or not.
52
 Given 
both variables are in natural log forms, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities: 
a 1% increase in per capita EDI spending is correlated with a 0.008% to 0.021% 
increase in top percentile income share. In addition, years of education are also 
negatively associated with income inequality, consistent with findings of Dincer and 
Gunalp (2012). Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis is again supported under difference 
GMM estimation, which is in line with previous studies (Kim, Huang, and Lin, 2011). 
There exists mixed evidence regarding the relationship between elder population and 
income equality with the estimates negative in most cases. Strangely, unemployment 
rate is positively related to the income share of top percentile. 
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 EDI spending is treated as exogenous in columns [1] and [3], endogenous in columns [2] and [4]. 
 
103 
4.6 Conclusion and Extensions 
This analysis investigates the relationship between EDI use and measures of 
income inequality at the state level. Drawing from data provided by GJF, the results 
suggest that EDI spending appears to be linked with widening income inequality, 
measured as top 1% share of income. 
There are important caveats worth noting. EDI may impact other economic 
measures such as growth, investment, employment, etc. However, the cost of potential 
benefits in these aspects could be a widening of income inequality. Considering the 
equality implications of the use of EDIs programs is an important factor in evaluations 
of EDI policy decisions. 
Data is another caveat. Although GJF is a national database and supports cross 
state analysis, it has limitations. These include aggregate reporting of multiple period 
EDI awards as well as the potential of missing observations of EDI programs, 
particularly smaller and less well publicized awards. To that end, analysis using 
different measures of EDIs, such as the database created by C2ER, would be a useful 
extension.  
There are many avenues for expanding this analysis, including: (1) Using other 
measures of income inequality to explore the relationship between EDI spending and 
inequality; (2) Extending the sample to include the period before 2000; and (3) 
Performing robustness check using forward orthogonal deviation transformation. I leave 
these for future work. 
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Table 4.1: Variable Names and Data Sources 
 
Notes: 
(1) I take natural log of the following variables:  Top1, EDI, Public welfare_exp, 
Unemployment_exp, and Income. 




Table 4.2: Summary Statistics (n=340) 
 
Notes: ‘Income^2 is the square of personal income in natural log form. 
Variable Description Source
Top 1 Income share of the top 1% http://www.shsu.edu/~eco_mwf/inequality.html
EDI EDI spending ($) Subsidy Tracker (GJF)
Public welfare_exp Spending on Welfare Programs($)  U.S. Census
Unemployment_exp Unemployment Compensation($)  U.S. Census
Yrs of Edu Years of education Turner et al (2006)
Income Personal income ($) Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Jobless Rate Unemployment rate (%) Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Union
% of nonagricultural employees covered by a 
collective bargaining
http://www.unionstats.com/
Above65 % of elder population U.S. Census
Below15 % of young population U.S. Census
Corruption Convinctions per 1,000,000 residents U.S. Department of Justice
Democratic control
Dummy variable equals 1 if state governor and 
legislature belong to the Democratic party
Calculated by author from NGA and NCSL
Corporate income tax rate Top statutory corporate income tax rate (%) Tax Foundation
Individual income tax rate Top statutory personal income tax rate (%) Tax Policy Center
Manufacturing Manufacturing share of employment  (%) U.S. Census
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Top 1 2.93 0.18 2.48 3.42
EDI 1.37 1.90 -5.47 6.32
Public welfare_exp -0.59 0.27 -1.37 0.13
Unemployment_exp -2.96 0.55 -4.52 -1.70
Yrs of Edu 13.62 0.37 11.90 14.45
Income 9.78 0.14 9.43 10.20
Income^2 95.57 2.67 89.02 104.07
Jobless Rate 5.36 1.78 2.2 13.3
Union 11.66 5.50 2.8 26.9
Above65 12.66 1.58 7.57 17.52
Below15 20.41 1.43 16.80 26.79
Corruption 3.39 2.72 0 25.05
Democratic control 0.22 0.42 0 1
Corporate income tax rate 0.06 0.03 0 0.12
Individual income tax rate 0.05 0.03 0 0.12
Manufacturing 12.10 4.49 4.01 23.69
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Top 1 (t-1) 0.750*** 0.748***
(0.045) (0.045)




Public welfare_exp 0.042 0.038 0.037
(0.039) (0.032) (0.032)
Unemployment_exp 0.027 -0.050** -0.050**
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
Yrs of Edu -0.109*** -0.050* -0.050*
(0.020) (0.026) (0.026)
Income 19.795*** 0.164 0.347
(6.026) (5.792) (5.846)
Income^2 -0.990*** -0.009 -0.018
(0.307) (0.293) (0.296)
Jobless Rate 0.007 -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Union -0.003 0.003* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Above 65 0.028*** -0.014** -0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Below 15 0.036*** -0.011 -0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Corruption -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Democratic control -0.041*** -0.010 -0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Corporate income tax rate -0.484** 0.103 0.102
(0.206) (0.216) (0.217)
Individual income tax rate -0.570*** -0.240 -0.232
(0.207) (0.223) (0.221)
Manufacturing -0.009*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -95.494*** 1.039 0.150
(29.547) (28.553) (28.818)
# of Obs 340 281 281
Adj. R-Square 0.70 0.72 0.72
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Top 1 (t-1) 0.476*** 0.475***
(0.046) (0.047)




Public welfare_exp -0.098 0.127** 0.126**
(0.080) (0.063) (0.063)
Unemployment_exp 0.028 -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.032) (0.024) (0.024)
Yrs of Edu -0.028 -0.022 -0.023
(0.041) (0.048) (0.048)
Income 72.832*** 32.079*** 32.208***
(9.037) (8.502) (8.538)
Income^2 -3.707*** -1.681*** -1.687***
(0.459) (0.434) (0.436)
Jobless Rate 0.000 -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Union -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Above 65 0.026 -0.197*** -0.197***
(0.052) (0.029) (0.029)
Below 15 -0.042 -0.167*** -0.168***
(0.031) (0.022) (0.022)
Corruption 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Democratic control -0.006 -0.025* -0.025*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Corporate income tax rate 0.168 0.327 0.326
(0.156) (0.200) (0.201)
Individual income tax rate -0.124 -0.557 -0.551
(0.197) (0.401) (0.402)
Manufacturing -0.012 -0.035*** -0.035***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant -353.673*** -144.573*** -145.151***
(43.889) (41.400) (41.562)
# of Obs 340 281 281
# of Groups 47 43 43
Adj. R-Square 0.85 0.85 0.85
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 EDI is treated as exogenous in columns [1] and [3], endogenous in columns [2] and [4], same for Table 
4.6. 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Top 1 (t-1) 0.687*** 0.761*** 0.688*** 0.742***
(0.042) (0.055) (0.044) (0.056)
EDI 0.011** 0.021* 0.008** 0.019
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012)
EDI (t-1) 0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Public welfare_exp 0.046 0.021 0.048 0.196
(0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.138)
Unemployment_exp -0.058*** -0.025 -0.057*** -0.024
(0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026)
Yrs of Edu -0.052** -0.054** -0.052** -0.073**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031)
Income 0.407*** 0.451*** 0.410*** 0.482***
(0.116) (0.119) (0.116) (0.156)
Income^2 -0.021** -0.024*** -0.021** -0.024**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Jobless Rate -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.034***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Union 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Above 65 -0.014* -0.021*** -0.014* -0.019**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Below 15 -0.011 -0.016* -0.010 -0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014)
Corruption -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Democratic control -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Corporate income tax rate 0.111 0.279 0.104 0.151
(0.199) (0.200) (0.199) (0.227)
Individual income tax rate -0.379 -0.326 -0.375 -0.768
(0.311) (0.315) (0.313) (0.527)
Manufacturing -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
# of Obs 281 281 281 281
# of Groups 43 43 43 43
AR(1) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
AR(2) 0.71 0.42 0.72 0.51
Hansen Test 0.65 0.80 0.68 0.95
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(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
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(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Above 65 -0.014* -0.021*** -0.014* -0.019**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Below 15 -0.011 -0.016* -0.010 -0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014)
Corruption -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Democratic control -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Corporate income tax rate 0.111 0.279 0.104 0.151
(0.199) (0.200) (0.199) (0.227)
Individual income tax rate -0.379 -0.326 -0.375 -0.768
(0.311) (0.315) (0.313) (0.527)
Manufacturing -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
# of Obs 281 281 281 281
# of Groups 43 43 43 43
AR(1) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
AR(2) 0.71 0.42 0.72 0.51
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